

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Russia — An Essay at Perspective

By JESSE CLARKSON

The interpretation of Russian phenomena depends very largely on the perspective in which Russia is viewed. Since the seventeenth century, Russian intellectuals have engaged in an intermittent debate on this score. On the one hand have been those who, dismayed at Russia's "backwardness," have urged that every effort be made to overtake—and surpass—the West. On the other have been those who, while admitting that Russia could profit by limited borrowings from the West, have emphasized the uniqueness of the values imbedded in her culture; these have therefore been chiefly concerned to preserve and to develop the peculiar characteristics of Russian life. The argument was never too sharply defined, even in the mid-nineteenth-century days when the two camps were known respectively as Westerners and Slavophiles, for the two views shaded into and overlapped each other.

In the West, where Russia was but little known, there arose a parody of this intellectual dispute. Although some thought they perceived a close parallelism, with a certain retardation, between Russian and Western European development, others were more impressed with certain striking differences. These latter tended to explain Russia as "Eastern" or "Asiatic." Even today one occasionally finds echoes of this concept, sometimes diluted to the compromise formula that Russia is both "European" and "Asiatic."

For such a perspective to have value requires an answer to the question of what is meant by "Asiatic" culture. The complex of phenomena known as "Western European" civilization is not difficult to establish, but is there any common denomi-

nator for the culture, or cultures, of Asia? Is one thinking of China? Or of the vastly different culture of India? Do they have anything in common save that both, each in its own way, differ radically from Western Europe? Or is one thinking of the Ancient Near East, of the "fertile crescent" stretching from the Nile to the Tigris and Euphrates? But was not this latter area the cradle, however bifocal, of "Western civilization? Does it not lie behind Hellenistic civilization? And is this not the culture which, through the medium of the Roman empire, was the ancestor of our "Western," "European," culture?

There remains another possible type of "Asiatic" culture. It is that of the grasslands of Central Asia, the "culture" of the pastoral nomads, whether Iranian, Hunnic, Turco-Tatar, or Mongol. This is the only aspect of "Asiatic" culture which can possibly be meant as having had any direct influence on Russia. It should be immediately obvious that pastoral nomads, however much they might ravage and subject to tribute the settled agricultural inhabitants of the Russian forests, could not exercise more than the most superficial influence on peoples among whom they did not settle. Their manner of life permitted them physically to occupy the steppe but not the area inhabited by the forest-dwelling Slavs.

The Tatars were a powerful external force, impeding but not diverting the stream of Russia's historical development. They did not govern the Russians or change their political institutions; they interfered in Russian affairs only sporadically, only when it was necessary to insure collection of the tribute, which the Russian princes transmitted to the Horde. So soon as the growth of population permitted by a developing agricultural economy (in contrast to the relative stagnation of pastoral nomadism) had turned the balance of military strength in favor of the forest against the steppe, the Tatar yoke was sloughed off, without even a battle. The old nursery saying, "Scratch a Russian and you'll catch a Tatar," reflects an igno-

rance of Russia's history as great as if one said "Scratch an American plainsman and you'll catch a Sioux."

Russia—historic Russia of the forests and swamps—had centuries of history before the Tatar conquest. The ideas and institutions she had formed in those centuries persisted, developing and changing by their own inner momentum rather than under the pressure of external, spasmodically exerted forces. If one looks back to Russia's beginnings, one finds a people speaking a language closely related to the languages of Western Europe, with religious ideas closely akin to those of the early Hellenes, Latins, or Teutons, earning their daily bread in the same way as other early Europeans, and with similar rudimentary political institutions. If they were distinguished by the lateness of their emergence into the light of history, this is clearly attributable to the harshness and poverty of their natural environment; basically similar to that of the West as was their forest habitat, agriculture was more difficult in their more northerly latitudes, unprotected by mountain barriers and without benefit from the Gulf Stream.

Like their fellow barbarians of the West, they accepted Christianity as a result of contact with the civilized peoples of the Mediterranean. It was the same Christianity that the West accepted. Certain ecclesiastical, but not religious, differences caused the Church to play a less significant role in Russia than it did in the political history of the West. Russia's failure to adopt also the language of the Church prevented that institution from serving as quite so effective a transmission belt for the learning and thought of antiquity, but the differences can easily be exaggerated.

It would be futile to object that Russia derived her culture from Byzantium, and that Byzantium represented the "East." It is from this East that Russia and the West alike received their common Nicene creed, and Byzantium remained for centuries the main source of culture for the West that had lapsed into

barbarism. It is easy to forget that Byzantium was the continuation of the Roman empire, and that the eastern part of that empire had always been culturally more advanced than the western. It should not be overlooked that the "Roman law," which was to have so profound an effect on Western development, was codified at Byzantium long after the "fall" of Rome.

The great Kliuchevsky brushed aside the possibility that Russia could ever have developed a feudal system, on the ground that her free and mobile peasantry did not provide the necessary fixed base on which feudalism could rest. Subsequent closer examination of agrarian relations has radically altered his picture of the Kievan and "appanage" peasantry, and study of political relations has made out a convincing case for the existence of a feudalism in Russia, differing from Western feudalism no more than did feudalism differ in various areas of the West. The processes by which Moscow ultimately "gathered the land" under her hegemony present no startling contrast to similar processes in the West.

What most distinguished Russian history from that of the West developed most markedly in the sixteenth century. So far as any reign can be said to mark a turning point, that of Ivan the Terrible was critical. This is the point at which autocracy emerges in Russia, though it is only incidental that this is also the moment when the title of "tsar" was superimposed on that of "grand prince." The development of absolute monarchy is of course not peculiar to Russia. What is significant is the difference in the base on which it rested and consequently in its nature. In the West the rise of absolute monarchy was rooted in the growth of trade and in the rise of a bourgeoisie, not to political, but to economic, power; the process was attended by the decline of serfdom. In Russia, where—again mainly for reasons of geography—there was virtually no development of a bourgeoisie, the rise of autocracy was based on the servile submission of the landed nobility, in exchange for the

support the state gave to the consolidation of serfdom. Once the resistance of the boyars, the feudal aristocracy, had been broken, there was no check on the increasing strength of the central power.

It is in this unusual relationship, this twin growth of autocracy and serfdom, that lies the chief divergence of Russian history from the history of "the West." Strengthened throughout the seventeenth century, the new Russian autocracy and the serfdom in which it was rooted remained unaffected by the "reforms" of Peter and by the rapid superficial "Europeanization" of the uppermost crust of Russian society in the eighteenth century. Only in the nineteenth century, with the growth of capitalist industry and the decreasing economic viability of the serf economy, with the increasing conversion of the state apparatus from an aristocratic to a bureaucratic machine, and with the increasingly obvious difficulty of supporting Russia's role as a Great Power while remaining technologically backward, was the autocracy at last driven to abandonment of its historic base by the Act of Emancipation.

Emancipation of the serfs entailed a number of other Great Reforms, also inspired not by the principle of liberalism but in the interest of state efficiency. The net result was that the nobility, once the masters of the means of production, were reduced essentially to the status of privileged pensioners of the state; weakened by forces that had long been sapping their vitality, the nobles could no longer serve as the effective bulwark of autocratic power. The logic of the situation demanded that the autocracy find some other social basis on which to rest. Yet it proved itself constitutionally unable to do so. Economic power was increasingly in the hands of the rapidly growing industrial bourgeoisie, but even the revolution of 1905 could persuade the autocracy to make only very limited and grudging concessions in a hesitating bid for its support. The Stolypin reform, designed to build, in the midst of the restless sea of peasant dis-

content, a solid footing of individual peasant proprietors who might be counted on to act as a conservative force, came too late.

Despite Russia's partnership in the Entente, the stress of war with Germany produced strains that a tottering autocracy could not withstand. The consequent sudden, swift collapse of Russia's autocracy resulted in chaos. Out of chaos arose a new, more efficient autocracy, which was able, as the old autocracy had not been, to seize control of large-scale industry. Thus it succeeded in resolving the social contradiction that had existed in the period between Emancipation and the Revolution, when political power had remained in the hands of a rootless autocracy while economic power had become ever more concentrated in the hands of a new capitalist class. By assuming the roles both of the autocrats and of the capitalists, the Bolsheviks found a new basis for autocracy by concentrating both political and economic power in their own hands.

The price Russia had to pay was enormous; not until a decade after the Revolution did Russia reach once more her pre-war level of economic life, a level which other, less disturbed countries had by then gone far beyond. Fresh efforts and fresh enormous sacrifices were required in the drive to overtake—and to surpass—the West. Outwardly, these efforts were inspired by Marxist ideology, itself an importation of a Western discard; inwardly, perhaps more potent was a surviving faith in Russia's own unique messianic mission. It may indeed be said that Russia had two faces, but they cannot well be characterized as "European" and "Asiatic." It is for Russians rather a question of whether they should imitate the West, attempting to overtake it by accepting its social and political values, or whether, while making limited, mainly technological borrowings, to preserve and foster the intangible something that Russians may think of as Russia's unique contribution to civilization, as justifying Russia's claim to leadership in the world.

Clearly, it is the latter view that is currently dominant among those who hold the reins in the Soviet Union. Whether they will be able to guide its destinies is another question. Apparently Russia is increasingly confronted with danger of a rift with China, representing an "East" that is as alien to Russia as it is to the "West." Not in terms of her historic culture, but in this limited and perhaps ephemeral sense, it may perhaps be said that for the moment Russia is between the East and the West of which she forms an integral, though specialized, part.

Kireevsky and the Problem of Culture

By JANKO LAVRIN

I

A frequent mistake with regard to Slavophilism is to simplify that movement by reducing it to the mere antithesis of Russia and Europe, or to the ideological wrangles between the Westerners and the Slavophiles. Yet the movement itself was varied and complex enough to be approached from a number of angles: historiosophical, cultural, racial, religious, or even psychological (implying Russia's conscious or subconscious inferiority complex with regard to the European West). Yet whatever its later aspects, changes, or even distortions, there can be no doubt that such early Slavophiles as Ivan Kireevsky (1806-56) and Alexei Khomyakov (1804-60) viewed the entire trend almost exclusively in its cultural and religious-philosophic perspective. This is particularly true of Ivan Kireevsky, since the very background responsible for his growth was enough to make him adopt and work out the ideology which claims him to be its actual founder.

Like the majority of the Slavophiles, Kireevsky was born into a family of well-to-do landed nobility, rooted in the soil and the patriarchal traditions of Russia. He and his brother Peter (the subsequent collector of the *byliny*) received a good education in Moscow where both became members of the "Wisdom Lovers" (*lyubomudry*). Founded in the early 1820's, this group was devoted to the romantic philosophy of Schelling, although the general orientation of the group was somewhat critical of Western Europe. Their short-lived periodical *Mnemosyne* (edited by Prince V. Odoevsky and the poet Küchelbecker)

even put forward the idea that Russia should become the leading State in the world of politics and of morals.

It was in Moscow, too, that Ivan started his career as one of the "archives youths" in the Collegium for Foreign Affairs at a time when Schelling's influence was paramount in that city. Such well-known figures as Galich and Professor Pavlov were enthusiastic Schellingians, despite the fact that, for "reasons of safety," the chair of philosophy was abolished at Moscow University in 1826.

Having thoroughly absorbed that idealistic atmosphere, Kireevsky conceived quite early the idea that Russia should evolve a philosophy of her own. He was also among the first to point out—in his *Survey of Russian Literature for 1829*—the thoroughly national character of Pushkin's genius. Having given up his government post, he left in 1803 for abroad but stayed for some eight months only in Germany, although he wrote in one of his letters rather sweepingly that there "does not exist on our planet a nation which is worse, more soulless, more stupid and more boring than the Germans." In Berlin he attended the lectures of Hegel and Schleiermacher, while in Munich he made personal acquaintance of Schelling. He returned to Russia with the ambition of editing a periodical of his own in which he could put forward the ideas he regarded as vital. In 1832 he thus founded a journal which he called, significantly enough, *The European (Europeets)*.

The very name of the periodical suggests that its tendency was not anti-European. He succeeded in gathering around it some of the ablest contributors of the day and wrote for the first number a kind of programmatic essay under the title, *The Nineteenth Century*. In spite of its quiet, objective tone and manner, this essay failed to please the guardians of law and order. After its second issue the periodical was clamped down. In a mood of frustration Kireevsky retired to his estate of Dolbino (in the Tula province) not very far from the Optina

monastery, famous on account of its *starsy* or Elders. Partly as a result of his conversations with some of those monks, and partly under the influence of his deeply religious wife (a sister of the poet Yazykov), whom he married in 1834, he now took a greater interest in religious problems. A particular stimulus in this respect also was his discovery of the writings of the Fathers of the Eastern Church in whom he found "more wisdom than in the entire German philosophy." No wonder he often expressed his regret that those writings were practically unknown in Europe.

In the early 1840's Kireevsky was aroused to new activities during the controversy between the Russian adherents of Schelling and those of Hegel, who now began to conquer the minds of the Russian youths. It was during that controversy that the Slavophile and the Western currents became finally differentiated and even mutually hostile. In 1845, when Kireevsky's Slavophile theory was already settled, he was invited by Pogodin to edit *The Muscovite* (*Moskvityanin*), but after three issues he quarrelled with Pogodin and would have nothing more to do with him. A few years later (in 1852) he contributed to Ivan Aksakov's *Moscow Miscellany* (*Moskovskii Sbornik*) his thoroughly Slavophile essay, "About the Enlightenment in Europe and the Enlightenment in Russia." The Russian word for enlightenment, *prosveshchenie*, stands here simply for culture—the sense in which Kireevsky used it. This essay was thoroughly sympathetic to Russia, yet the censors and police found enough subversive thoughts in it to clamp down on this publication also.

Soon the Crimean War broke out and the problem of Russia and Europe assumed a paramount significance, since two great European powers sided with Turkey against Russia. Fortunately, the defeat of Russia and the death of Nicholas I proved to be a boon in disguise. The accession of Alexander II to the throne inaugurated a new and more liberal era. The abolition

of serfdom was now taken for granted, and both the Slavophiles and the Westerners were equally anxious to see it liquidated. One of the leading Slavophiles, Yury Samarin (1819-76) became a member of the special commission set up to prepare that great reform. Another prominent Slavophile, Constantine S. Aksakov (Ivan Aksakov's brother) even sent to the new Tsar a memorandum written with remarkable frankness and courage. In 1856 the Slavophiles were, moreover, allowed to publish their own periodical, *The Russian Discourse* (*Russkaya Beseda*.) It was to this periodical that Kireevsky sent his last and most important essay, "On the Need and the Possibilities of New Principles in Philosophy," soon after which he died—on June 11, 1856.

II

In contrast to that other founder of Slavophilism, Alexei S. Khomyakov, who was primarily a lay-theologian, Kireevsky was a philosopher in his own right, although he too refused to divorce philosophy from religion. The problem of Russia and the West, to which his periodical *The European* was to be dedicated, was viewed by him largely from a cultural and philosophic-religious angle. In his leading article, "The Nineteenth Century," he was rather critical of Russian civilization so different from that organic and unified civilization which Western Europe had inherited from ancient Rome. Some of Kireevsky's judgments are almost as harsh as those expressed by Chaadaev in his ill-starred "Philosophic Letter" which was published four years later, in 1836. Yet in Kireevsky's opinion Europe was getting exhausted, while Russia was full of vitality. Far from antagonizing Western Europe, Russia should join her universal culture: she should absorb and assimilate all the creative elements of the West in order to make her own contribution not as an enemy of Europe but in the name of a synthesis of Western values and those contributed by herself.

This romantic idea of a cultural synthesis (but with the

stress on the "Russian" part of it) became one of the guiding ideas among the Slavophiles from Kireevsky to Dostoevsky, although in Kireevsky's second essay, "About the Enlightenment in Europe and the Enlightenment in Russia" (written some twenty years later in the form of a long letter to Count E. E. Komarovsky), the two "enlightenments" are treated as anti-thetic in a Slavophile sense. The dialectical contrast between the two only puts the problem itself into sharper relief. Science and technique may have reached their climax in the West, yet, so Kireevsky argues, cold intellectual analysis has destroyed in Western Europe that essential meaning of life which alone can give the right direction to our existence and to all our doings. Yet at the very height of its power the intellect came to the awareness of its own limitations: it reached the conclusion that vital higher truths are beyond the competence of mere abstract reasoning. After the superficial rationalistic optimism of the eighteenth century, Western man saw the futile cobwebs of such reasoning and became increasingly skeptical that his own intellect could solve the ultimate truth of life. Hence he grew indifferent towards everything beyond his sensual appetites and his materialistic gains; or else he clung to those obsolete values and convictions which had prevailed before the era of excessive abstract reasoning set in. Life in the West fell prey to general "fragmentation" and cold individualism.

While grafting European civilization upon Russia, Peter the Great had made a belated attempt to secularize Russian culture or "enlightenment" after the Western pattern, i. e., by divorcing it from Church and religion. He succeeded only with a small portion of the population, namely with the nobility, whereas the peasant masses remained practically intact. But a time came when quite a few of those infected felt the inadequacy of what the West could offer them. So they began to turn their eyes to the essential Russian values—the values of that idealized pre-Petrine Russia which had been more or less

debarred from any closer contact with Western Europe. In discussing this problem, Kireevsky pointed out three specifically "Russian" features: the spirit of the Orthodox Church, the essence of what he called true Russian enlightenment, and the peculiar formation of the Russian State.

Having received their Christianity from Byzantium, the Russians came under the influence of the Eastern Church whose main feature is spiritual contemplation. Whereas in the West the Church had adopted (and adapted) Aristotle, the Byzantine Church assimilated the spirit of Plato. Hence the richer wisdom of the patristic writings in the East. In a way the Western Church continued the formalistic and legal tradition of ancient Rome. The Byzantine Church, on the other hand, laid stress not so much upon external legality as upon man's conscience and the inner sense of justice—a feature which Kireevsky regarded as typical of the traditional Russian enlightenment. And as for the Russian State, it had arisen not as a result of violent conquest and the struggle for power as was the case in the West, but—so he says—peacefully, out of the social and religious consciousness of the people.

In the West there existed a fierce struggle between Church and worldly power on the one hand, and between religion and man's intellect on the other. Russia, however, having been outside the influences of Rome, the Renaissance, and the Reformation, escaped those excesses of abstract reasoning which, according to Kireevsky, have undermined the creative power of the spirit and produced an enormous mechanical and commercial civilization at the expense of true culture. And as for Western individualism let loose, it soon became an agent of division and finally degenerated, step by step, into the most appalling type of egoism, as well as into the hardly less appalling isolation of man.

The edifice of European "enlightenment" has thus been undermined by the elements which were either latent in it or

else created by it. At the same time the one-sided logic could not but obscure those living truths which transcend mere logic. The father of modern philosophy—Descartes—pretended to be aware of his own being not spontaneously, but through logical syllogisms: *cogito ergo sum*. The skeptical philosophy of Hume and, eventually, Kant's conclusions with regard to the incompetence of man's "pure reason" about the ultimate truths of existence were unavoidable results of such an attitude. Yet Kant's own thought pointed to the need of overcoming the blind-alley by finding some other means of cognition. While Hegel brought the logical method to its final conclusions, Schelling demonstrated the one-sidedness of such pan-logism and devised his own theory of the self-evolving *Weltseele* (world-soul) which reaches in man's consciousness the height of its own awareness. Gradually, however, Kireevsky found Schelling, too, insufficient. And so he went his own way, which brought him nearer to the patristic wisdom of the Eastern Church in the light of which he now tried also to interpret (whether rightly or wrongly) the enlightenment of the idealized pre-Petrine Russia. Under the impact of this wisdom, he wrote his last and most important essay, "On the Need and the Possibility of the New Principles in Philosophy."

III

This essay reads like a draft for a much larger work. Sketchy though it be, it yet illustrates Kireevsky's final attitude towards the problem discussed. This can be defined as an attempt to blend the Western principle of the intellect with that religious intuition which he had found in the Eastern type of Christianity, as well as in that of pre-Petrine Russia. In his criticism of the philosophic thought of Bacon and Descartes, he once again pointed out the inadequacy of a mere intellectual approach. "For if man rejects any authority except that of his abstract thought, he can hardly go beyond the outlook, according to which the existence of the world itself seems to him but

transparent dialectics of his own reason." At the same time those Western minds who had tried to have religion by separating it both from philosophy and the intellect, were also wrong, since such a separation was bound to harm religion itself.

Preoccupied with the universal message of Christianity, Kireevsky pointed out that in both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism the boundary-line between man's intellect and religious consciousness has been distorted and disturbed. Moreover, since in Protestantism, for example, there was no general agreement about the fundamental truths, everybody considered it necessary to search for them in his own way. Hence the rise of rationalistic philosophy. Yet such philosophy, if separated from that intuitive religious Truth based on the general consensus, typical of what the Slavophiles meant by *sobornost*,¹ was bound to lead to irreligion. Intellect and religion became hostile to each other, despite the repeated single efforts to reconcile the two. Instead of serving life, Western philosophy thus lost all touch with living life and became in fact a destructive agent. Divorced from the inner essence of things, Western man has fallen a prey to the external physical world in which there was no room left for religion. Russia alone, or rather the Russian people, stayed out of this process even after Peter the Great. This has enabled them not only to preserve their inner unity, but also to rescue religion as a most vital element of both culture and life. Such in fact was, or ought to be, the mission of Russia as an alternative to a Westernized Russia.

Convinced that man is able to penetrate to the heart of reality only through the whole of his being, Kireevsky insisted that rational thinking itself should be raised to that suprarational plane on which all the diverging elements of man—reason, will, faith, and feeling—could find their unifying focus. On this

¹The nearest translation of this word is the Greek word *pleroma* - a community held together from within, by the power of love and of the spirit.

plane alone the highest Truth of life can co-ordinate the lower truths in its own service. But if left to themselves, these truths become isolated, split up, hostile to any unity, and therefore hostile to man. Since, according to Kireevsky, religion means nothing less than a perfect inner union between man, God, and the world, the intellect itself is bound to be assigned its proper place in such a unity. And this is necessary. For where religion is without a rightly developed and co-ordinated intellectual element, full life becomes impossible. In the same way one-sided stress on the intellect alone also precludes the fullness of man's existence. Moreover, as soon as deep religious convictions have been replaced by mere philosophic or pseudo-philosophic opinions, the mind itself runs the danger of being led astray and of conjuring up false attitudes and values.

IV

In his further explorations Kireevsky contrasted the religious consciousness of the Russian people with the erudition of the Europeanized upper classes in Russia. One of his fears was that their type of erudition, borrowed from the West and irreligious by its nature, might infect the people and thus ravage them spiritually. This would mean the victory of the European element with its materialistic mentality and civilization uppermost. The opposite possibility was that the people might, perhaps, win the intellectuals over and thus assimilate the already existing European influences without succumbing to them, i.e., without forfeiting the religious spirit inherent in the masses.

Anyway, a kind of new culture or "enlightenment" might result from such a fusion. Something similar happened when Christianity had paved its way through the pagan erudition to its own wisdom recorded by the Fathers of the Eastern or Orthodox Church. For us it would, of course, be impossible to adopt their philosophy in exactly the same shape which it had assumed in those days. Our type of enlightenment is not the same. Nor are the problems we are called to cope with. Yet by

integrating their religious wisdom with our contemporary knowledge we could produce a new type of philosophy which, instead of remaining on the bookshelves, might permeate the whole of our existence.

While pointing out the difference between the two German words, *Verstand* (the understanding reason) and *Vernunft* (the logical intellect), Kireevsky entirely agreed with Schelling that our Western philosophy has become mere *Vernunftswissenschaft*. But for this very reason he demanded a deeper and more direct method of cognition. He insisted above all on what he called the "believing reason," or the intuitive reason of faith which, according to him, resides in the spiritual core of man's being. He warned us, however, that such reason should not be confused with the "natural reason" which is competent to deal with external matters only, whereas the former can serve as a link between man and God, between man and the true reality of things. Once this link has been lost, man too is lost. He becomes a stranger in the universe, a stranger to others and to himself.

The principal defect of the Western world was, in Kireevsky's opinion, precisely such a loss. Hence the "fragmented" humanity of Western Europe with its grabbing individualism. In the despotic organizations of the East, on the other hand, the individual is of no account, and this is equally bad—bad from the other end. The task of Russia should be to provide a remedy for both by creating a Christian culture in which the freedom and the fullness of man's existence should go hand in hand with the universal brotherhood of men.

It was in the name of such a culture that Kireevsky worked out the tenets of that religious-philosophic ideology which served as a basis for Slavophilism, at least in its early stages. True enough, the whole of his philosophy has remained in the shape of a torso, since he himself was far from being a prolific writer. Yet even so, it can serve as an interesting approach to

that dilemma of Russia and Europe which has been one of the principal worries of the Russian consciousness from Peter the Great until our own days. As formulated by the founders of Slavophilism, this dilemma was not political in its early stages, but cultural *par excellence*. Culture—in their opinion—was inseparable from the deeper religious and spiritual values. The now fashionable distinction between culture and mere mechanical civilization was more than topical with such Slavophiles as Kireevsky and Khomyakov. And, whether rightly or wrongly, they identified it with the difference between an idealized, utopian Russia on the one hand, and an underestimated (and secretly feared) Europe on the other.

War and Peace in Soviet Policy

By RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

WORLD communism is the ultimate goal of the Soviet leaders; it is the *summum bonum* to which they all aspire. This aspiration feeds and clothes a striving for power, but it is also based on expectation derived from the Marxist-Leninist view of history. Nonetheless, while seeking to expand their influence and power beyond the Communist bloc, the Soviet leaders give primary attention to maintaining the security of the Soviet state. Moreover, they also do have goals of internal national development and progress not exclusively directed toward amassing power in the world. Soviet global strategy may be summarized as follows: To advance the power of the U. S. S. R. in whatever ways are most expedient so long as the survival of the Soviet power itself is not endangered.

It is evident that the Soviet leaders have decided that deliberate initiation of general war would not be in their interest in the foreseeable future. However, "peaceful coexistence" means that the Soviets will continue to pursue a vigorous policy of expansion of their influence and power by means short of major war. They are exerting great efforts to identify themselves with ideals such as peace, disarmament, national liberation, and the like—ideals widely held in the world. They also attempt to bend those seeking these ideals to their own ends. Finally, they are alert to exploit counterdeterrence (that is, the neutralization of our deterrent for certain local challenges) when they consider the risks to be low, especially in cases where aggression can be indirect. While probably in general avoiding a belligerent posture, the Soviets are not reticent about advertising their growing power, and we may expect a continuation of

boldly insinuated threats whenever they consider it appropriate. Indirect aggrandizement is masked to lull those in the world who are prone to overlook all but the most blatant Communist aggression.

What about the oft-raised problem of weighing the respective roles of ideology and power politics in Soviet policy-making? For most purposes, there is no divergence or discrepancy. Both the Communist ideology and purely power-political considerations place the criterion of calculated risk, cost, and gain at the foundation of any strategic initiative. Communist doctrine certainly *does* inject unusually strong hostility and suspicion into Soviet policy-making, but Marxism-Leninism does *not* propel the Soviet Union blindly toward the embrace of war or the witting assumption of great risks. Why should the Soviet leaders, confident in their minds that they are moving with the sweep of history, court disaster by a premature gamble?

Mutual deterrence has already resulted from the acquisition of global thermonuclear striking power by the United States and now by the Soviet Union. Mutual deterrence has been described as a "delicate balance of terror." But while this balance is indeed insecure, and by no means inevitably enduring, it is not fragile. The risks and consequences of a global thermonuclear holocaust are recognized by the Soviet leaders, and they strive to avoid any "adventurist" gamble. The importance in Soviet policy of the overall balance of power, the "relation of forces in the world arena," as they call it, militates against a preoccupation with purely military solutions. The Soviet leaders are not poised to unleash the terrible might of their—and our—military power as soon as a theoretical probability of military victory crosses some calibrated balance of 50% or 70% or indeed even 90%. In the Communist view, history cannot be made hostage to the mathematical computations of some "communivac."

Thus nuclear war seems ever less likely as a rational tool for

the Soviet Union to advance its position. Of course, an irrational decision is always conceivable. But more dangerous, because more probable, is the possibility of a "war by miscalculation." There are a number of possible ways in which an unintended general nuclear war could occur. One very important one, often noted, is the possibility that local hostilities ("conventional," or all the more nuclear) might be expanded in the vortex of actions and reactions into a general nuclear war. No less important is the case of miscalculation which could arise from the danger of one side incorrectly believing the enemy to be about to launch a surprise attack, and therefore launching a preemptive blow in a desperate last-minute effort to blunt surprise, seize the initiative and get in the first strike.

Are there circumstances under which the Soviets might choose deliberately to initiate general war? Such a decision could only be based on calculations of an assured probability of destroying our retaliatory military power without suffering unacceptable losses. I submit that such a decision is extremely unlikely. No theoretical computation can be assured, and the dangers to the fabric of the Soviet state—and hence for the very regime, as well as for its base of power—would in any event remain both incalculable and ominous. To be an attractive objective, a first strike must not only assure a high probability of success, but also virtually eliminate the possibility of disaster. Moreover, the Soviet leaders expect the eventual victory of Communism in the world without this cost and risk. Finally, as we have noted, self-preservation is accorded an even higher priority in Soviet policy than expansion of Communist control.

In short, we see that while general nuclear war remains possible, it is not probable as a strategy fashioned to advance Soviet power. The danger is not so much that the Soviets will decide the time is ripe to strike us, as that they may misjudge the time as ripe to push us.

Flexibility is the keynote in determining concrete Soviet

objectives, depending upon concrete opportunities and constraints, and it evokes flexibility in their strategic thinking, doctrine, and plans. It also extends to flexibility in selection of political or military means.

In the Soviet view, the main arena of conflict is the political one. We tend to differentiate between the political, economic, military, and psychological factors in national power and in national strategy. The Soviets on the other hand consider that, while such factors as economic or military power have individual characteristics as instruments, all are subordinate to political strategy. Military power is thus by preference used to exert political influence.

Let us turn, in the first instance, to the Soviet effort to fragment the Free World, and the Western alliances in particular. It has always been an objective to divide the Free World, and especially to capitalize on what in Marxist-Leninist eyes are the inevitable contradictions in the world capitalist system. But before they could effectively begin to make inroads, it was necessary to modify the more crude oversimplifications in the Marxian image. Not until about the time of Stalin's death did they begin to show signs of recognizing that the world was not all Red or White, but that there were various neutral and pink shadings in between. Not until well after Stalin's death did they actually begin to do anything about it. This more correct and useful differentiation between the various shades of leftist neutralist, neutral, pro-Western neutral, allied, and "hard-core" NATO countries—and the recognition that on some issues even the unity of the principal Western powers might be affected—has become a part of the foundation for their political strategy. This new orientation permits the Soviets more effectively to drive wedges into the Western alliances. Nonetheless, I think we can say that the Soviet campaign to weaken the Western alliance system has proved relatively ineffective, and further that the Soviets are aware of this. It remains, however, a pre-

mise of Soviet political strategy that ultimately the West can be compelled to draw the necessary conclusions from the objective relation of forces in the world—and they now believe it to be gradually and continually shifting in their favor. This does not mean that the Soviets feel that they can now, or ever, push us around in whatever ways they wish; but it does mean, for example, that if the relation of power seems to them to be such that the West must accept the *status quo* of divided Germany and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, then it is incumbent upon the Soviets to prod us into reluctant eventual recognition of the fact, and of its logical consequences, such as a new status for West Berlin. The Soviets will be impressed by any evidence of a changed relation of power, but not for long by declarations which seem to them merely rear-guard reluctance to recognize what they believe to be the real power situation.

The Soviet leaders are pushing a rapid development of their economy as a foundation for national power. The Soviet economic aid and trade program in the economically underdeveloped and politically uncommitted countries is important especially for its political effect, and also for the opportunities it affords for imposing economic dependence and for infiltration. On a broader scale, however, the general economic growth and scientific advance of the U. S. S. R. is probably the most significant economic factor, and indeed the main external effect of Soviet internal development. And of this the Soviet leaders are well aware. Many people and even some governments are willing to overlook—and in some cases secretly to envy—much of the regimentation of life in Communist states, while concentrating their focus on the rapid achievement of industrialization, modernization, and power status in the world. Khrushchev constantly refers to the power of the example of Soviet economic advances as a major factor in bringing other peoples to Communism.

It is not necessary in this context to say more about the eco-

conomic factor in Soviet national strategy, except to note that even though some of the more extreme Soviet slogans on overtaking the U. S. are patently unrealistic, their economic system is expanding at a very impressive rate, and that they *are* gradually closing the gap to overtake us. The importance of this in the minds of Khrushchev and his colleagues would be difficult to exaggerate.

Another major facet of Soviet national policy is the effort to embrace, with publicity if not with ardor, the idea of Communist favor for disarmament. Clearly, to the extent they are able, the Soviet leaders would prefer to disarm us—in all senses of the word. But it is also clear to them that while they may sometimes embarrass us or even inhibit our freedom of action, they cannot seriously get us to disarm without paying roughly equivalent penalties.

In much of Soviet policy in this field—especially concerning a nuclear test ban and limitations on nuclear weapons deployment—the Soviets seek to neutralize some of the political effect of our military power and to place restrictions on our use of nuclear weapons for any limited war. They have already helped to place a stigma on nuclear weapons in the eyes of many people throughout the world. If they inhibit us from the use of the weapons in *any* specific instance they gain. And if in some local case we should use them, we would then at the least suffer substantial onus for doing so. But on the major disarmament issues, owing to the Soviet unwillingness to allow effective inspection controls for genuine overall disarmament, and despite a probably genuine Soviet interest in reducing arms outlays, the prospect for any comprehensive agreement is very dim.

Akin to the Soviet efforts to identify themselves with and capitalize on widespread yearnings for peace and against atomic weapons are their efforts to get a free ride on the crest of the wave of nationalism in the former colonial areas. To mix in another metaphor, the strain on the honeymoon with Nasser a

year or two ago showed it up as a marriage of convenience which to a significant degree proved also a matter of some inconvenience to both partners. Nonetheless, despite such conflicts and despite the uneasiness of some neutralists with the Hungarian and Tibetan suppressions, the Soviets still seek to appear as the champions of disinterested and noble anti-imperialism. The Soviets have always seen support for the national-liberation movement as only an initial stage, the stage of removal of Western influence in the areas involved. The second stage, that of movement *toward* the Communist camp, follows. And it is precisely this move which, not unnaturally, displeases the first-stage nationalists who in turn become the target for displacement.

There is one crucial question concerning relations within the Communist bloc: Soviet relations with Communist China. There are those who argue that the independent national identities of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China inevitably lead to independent policies and conflict. Others argue that a common ideology inexorably leads to a common policy and to absence of any conflict between the two. This writer would be inclined to argue with the premises of both of these views. The U. S. S. R. and the Chinese Peoples' Republic are independent states with individual and sometimes conflicting aims, but they are quite likely at least for some time to find a continued alliance against the United States the chief influence keeping them together. On the other hand, while sharing Communist aims and viewpoints, ideological issues have already caused serious conflicts and will probably lead to further ones. In sum, the policies of the two powers are coordinated but not identical; important differences both of national policies and of internal Communist bloc policies exist and will probably grow, despite the great advantages each finds in supplementing its own power with that of the other. The Soviets seek to maintain the alliance, and at the same time to maintain a dominant position within it, but they are finding this increasingly difficult to do.

Perhaps it would be in order to deal briefly with the internal situation in the U. S. S. R. as it affects the Soviet challenge to us. Three main points deserve attention. First, some major changes have occurred in the Soviet Union over the past seven years, and others are still occurring. The situation of the people as a whole has been improving—both materially and in other ways. The regime now relies much less on terror to coerce and much more on persuasion to attain cooperation. (Orwell's 1984 was nearer in 1948 than it is today). The Soviet regime is today probably more "accepted," if not loved, at home than at any time since its inception. Moreover, there is genuine national pride in *Sputnik* and other achievements.

Notwithstanding these not insignificant changes, the system in its essentials is unchanged. It remains a totalitarian dictatorship ruled through a monopoly party with an expansionist doctrine. It is not moving toward representative government. Moreover, while it has broadened the base of its popular acceptance, it is supported not because it is Communist and certainly not because it harbors aggressive aims, but despite these things and mostly because it is simply the Russian government. In addition, many in an articulate if small minority are learning enough about the rest of the world to know how little they have in so many important respects. Finally, in order to build rapport with the people, the regime has in effect had to move nearer to them, and thus—even though not "forced" to do so—it has consented to place some limitations on its own freedom of action.

The third and final relevant aspect of the internal scene is that while we may welcome a moderation of internal repression and the growth of the welfare of the people, such a development is by no means any indication that the Soviet Union necessarily will become fundamentally any easier to get along with. Indeed the opposite could be argued, since if the giant no longer has feet of clay he is the more dangerous an opponent. In short,

the internal situation—despite not insignificant changes—is not likely to cause a fundamental modification in Soviet external policy in the foreseeable future.

Let us turn now from this review of the main political aspects of the Soviet challenge. In view of the Soviet preference and intention for expansion of power by essentially political means, what is the role of military strategy?

"The objective of military strategy," we read in a Soviet General Staff organ, "is the creation by military means of those conditions under which politics is in a position to achieve the aims it sets for itself." In keeping with this principle, Soviet military doctrine holds necessary the coordinated use of any form of military power, as expedient. This concept presupposes maintenance of a military establishment which allows for flexibility in selecting military means. It is reflected in Soviet acceptance of the principle of balanced and varied military capabilities, and in the rejection of any strategy based upon predominant reliance on any particular weapons system—including the ICBM. This approach is deeply ingrained in the Communist precept to avoid "adventuristic gambling" on any single or superficially "easy" means to victory. And under contemporary circumstances, as we have noted, the Soviets see no margin for general war.

The Soviet strategic concept is predicated on the fundamental principle that war, as an instrument of policy, may assume various forms. Limitations on theaters of conflict, or on use of nuclear or other weapons, are considered as questions involving calculated advantage, and calculated maneuver to establish the conditions which would induce the opponent in his own self-interest to accept the limitations. Limited conflicts, indeed, represent the classic form of Communist military action, for limited objectives, at limited risk. But this should not be taken as meaning that the Soviets are likely to swerve from their general line

of "peaceful" political extension of influence throughout the world toward a policy of overt small wars.

Let us now turn to brief but important reflection on the forces and capabilities envisaged and created in support of the Soviet strategy. We need review in no detail the inventory of Soviet military power. The general facts are well known: An emerging ICBM capability; a large ground army, equipped with excellent, modern materiel; tactical, airlift, and naval supporting air forces as well as enhanced air defense and long-range striking power; and in the navy a moderate conventional surface force and a very large submarine fleet. Khrushchev announced in January, 1960, a plan to reduce the manpower of the Soviet armed forces by one-third over the following year or two, and to alter the force structure of the military establishment. The Soviets evidently judged that even with this cutback they will still have an adequate military force to meet requirements for the coming years: A strong and growing nuclear-missile deterrent and "counterdeterrent" to the U. S. strategic delivery capability, including a strong home air defense force, and powerful theater forces capable of providing superiority in any limited wars, and able both to move at once and simultaneously to form the core for large-scale mobilization in case of general war. The main point of interest is the highly significant fact that the nature, size, composition, organization and deployment of the Soviet armed forces *all* reflect very clearly the Soviet strategic concept and doctrine. The Soviet view of extended campaigns even in general war, in addition to being reflected in military doctrinal writings, is supported by the corresponding Soviet capabilities.

Khrushchev's speech on reduction in forces actually represented a major policy decision by the Soviet government, reflecting among other considerations their view that war is not expected in the years ahead. However, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that the Soviets are now adopting

a "New Look" policy. Indications are that Khrushchev has been thinking primarily of substituting missiles for weapons systems which they can replace—manned bombers, fighters, fire support surface ships, and some artillery. Missiles do not replace components which perform a different and complementary function which the Soviets consider still essential in case of war—seizure and holding of territories. The dual adjustment to new weapons potentialities, and to the political situation which Khrushchev foresees, permit savings in manpower, goods, and money—and political-propaganda dividends as well—and the addition of these valuable resources to economic and political programs which the Soviet leaders believe will have an important role in shaping the course of history and extending their influence. But in defining and building the military capabilities to implement their strategic concept, the Soviets continue to be guided not by replacement of the capacities for conventional warfare, but by the addition to them of capacities for either general or limited nuclear war.

In conclusion, it may be useful to note some direct implications of the Soviet challenge. Perhaps first of all is the need to examine the overall and long-run nature of the Soviet threat. It is not just the danger that they might try to liquidate capitalism by a nuclear-missile Armageddon, awesome as that threat is. For if we do continue to deter this danger we are still only buying time, time which may or may not be running in our favor. We must make the great efforts necessary to develop an effective and stable (though not stagnant) political, psychological, economic, and military situation in the world which will undercut the full gamut of Communist efforts to spread their influence. At the same time, we must not only counter Communist penetration, but also positively contribute to realizing all the bountiful potentialities of our own life. If we are going to persuade the "middle billion" of Asia and Africa that free and representative government offers more than Communism

and party rule, we must show them that our system is at least as dynamic as the Soviet one.

Mutually recognized ability of each side virtually to destroy the other, no matter who strikes first, is fast coming upon us. Even before such a state is reached in fact, mutual deterrence or strategic stalemate is for all practical purposes here already. The Soviet Union seeks to take advantage of this strategic nuclear stalemate to pursue more actively policies to her advantage and contrary to the interests of the Free World. If the United States were to have a national strategy and a corresponding political posture and military capability primed *only* to deter the enemy by threat of total — but mutual — destruction, the Soviets might calculate that for lesser provocation than direct attack upon the United States the total retaliation would not be made. A deterrent must be credible, and whether correctly or not, the Soviets might not always believe we would subject the United States to nuclear devastation to save a distant ally. A choice between piecemeal surrender of individually non-essential friends, barriers, and redoubts overseas, or invocation of a suicidal strategy of massive mutual annihilation, would be a terrible dilemma indeed.

Thus, the threat of retaliation by total destruction may deter only total wars. This "total" deterrence, and the maintenance of the forces necessary to impress its seriousness, *are essential, but not sufficient*. To deter from lesser threat, or failing deterrence, to meet lesser military challenges, a flexible strategy supported by capabilities for measured retaliation or confrontation is essential to provide the necessary basis for strategic choice. A military policy and posture is needed which provides for reliance upon local use of nuclear weapons or of conventional forces, depending upon the concrete circumstances, to meet local aggression and provocation. Moreover, the Communists will seek to obscure the political foundation for our response by having prepared the ground politically so that an

aggression is not clearcut, but appears as a civil war or in some other guise.

Most important of all, the United States must constantly remain alert and aware of the many facets of the overall Soviet threat so that we do not, in countering one aspect of it, ignore or even indirectly facilitate others. It is, indeed, in the overall global political and psychological realm that the greatest challenge lies.

The World of Vladimir Nabokov

By GEORGE IVASK

The most perceptive reader I have met in the United States, a Mrs. X—, of Newton, Massachusetts, said of the writings of Vladimir Nabokov, "He is the most conceited writer I know, but still very amusing!" It is true. Nabokov plays for his own pleasure only! Yet the reader cannot help but share his delight.

Nabokov's boundless intellectual and artistic curiosity make him a kind of visual glutton: he does not merely look at life; he devours it down to the last crumb. A tireless observer of the infinite variety of amazing things of our world and the uniqueness of its phenomena, Nabokov completely assimilates his impressions and transforms what he sees into an entirely new vision of the world. His poetic genius soars off into space, above the mundane and the commonplace. So intense is his awareness, so fresh and original his language, that life in Nabokov's distinctly personal world sometimes seems to the reader as strange as life on a far-off planet — not a life in which we can become directly involved, but seen only through a powerful telescope. The images before us are sharp and clear — the fine instrument of Nabokov's mind makes them so — but we feel ourselves to be immeasurably removed from them.

Nabokov is continually looking for new similes and metaphors to unite objects and impressions that are never alike, but that still resemble each other and thus form a great brotherhood of similarities. In *Speak, Memory!*, one of these unusual figures shows us fancifully how Nabokov transports himself to his own little world in space:

I like to fold my magic carpet, after use, in such a way as to superimpose one part of the pattern upon another.¹

¹V. Nabokov, *Speak, Memory!*, 1951, p. 96.

In the Russian version of his memoirs (which, incidentally, does not coincide with the English one), Nabokov philosophizes on "divine space" and "diabolic time." It was, indeed, in this very space that he experienced a kind of ecstasy:

A thrill of gratitude to whom it may concern—to the contrapuntal genius of human fate, or to tender ghosts humoring a lucky mortal.²

Nabokov is alien to any kind of religion, yet here he is affirming a link or bond with someone or something unknown which is metaphysically postulated in a state of ecstasy sometimes provoked by flying butterflies, which he appreciates and understands, both as poet and scholar.

What kind of people are Nabokov's characters? They are vivid (strikingly pictured); yet not vital (immediate, warm). They seem detached from reality as we know it and have validity only in Nabokov's own weird world. Neither American nor British literary critics have imputed the charge of "lifelessness" to Nabokov's characters, so far as I have observed, though some Russian critics have done so. "His characters are perfectly painted dolls, well-placed in a shop window,"³ wrote George Adamovich, who is still the most influential critic among the Russian émigrés. Even Vladislav Khodasevich (1886-1939), whose disputatious attitude toward Adamovich was observed for many years, came very close to his opponent in affirming that Nabokov's novels are populated not only by human characters, but also by a multitude of literary devices, methods which, like elves or gnomes, alter the entire scenery before the reader's eyes, thus proclaiming that the author himself is uninterested in deceiving anyone with the illusion of life-likeness.⁴

Nabokov's characters can be divided into two general categories: the seeing and the blind. Totally blind, I believe, are all

²Ibid., p. 97.

³G. Adamovich, *Solitude and Freedom*, 1955, p. 214.

⁴V. Khodasevich, *Literary Essays and Memoirs*, 1954, pp. 249-250.

his women characters, including Lolita. Also blind, without distinction as to sex, are most of his vulgar characters, which he cruelly ridicules with his gay but biting satire. But what is vulgarity? Nabokov discusses this theme in his book on Gogol where he succeeds in translating the Russian word *poshlost* into English. Self-satisfaction, vanity, stupidity, and, I may add, blindness — the lack of ability to see the world as though it had just been born, as always brand-new — characterize vulgar people.

There are many seeing people in the Nabokov novels. The best and shortest description of a man with open eyes is found in his Russian short story, "Cloud, Lake, Tower." Here we find, perhaps, the key to his artistic laboratory. The Russian title forms a dactyl — *oblako, ozero, bashnia* — which may find an equivalent in two horizontal gestures (*oblako*-cloud, *ozero*-lake) cut by the final vertical one (*bashnia*-tower): (— —|). The hero is an almost Chekovian "little man," a middle-aged émigré living in Berlin, where he receives free tickets for a three-day excursion *ins Gruene*. In the car he opens a book of the great Russian poet Tiutchev. The gesture immediately arouses suspicion in his German companions: "He is not like us; we have to teach him how to behave!" They even throw out the window his Russian cucumber, "which decent people never eat." Still, our meek eccentric reaches complete happiness in contemplating the world as seen outside the train. He asks himself: this design, a spot on the platform made by a cherry stone and a cigarette butt, is it not immortally beautiful? Or — who are the children playing there? Will their unknown destiny take the shape of a violin or a crown, of a propeller or a lyre? Finally there appears a real wonder — the landscape expressed in dactyls: *oblako, ozero, bashnia*. The little man with the eyes of a genius decides to stay here forever: farewell, friends, farewell! But the infuriated German philistines force him into the train. There they all begin to beat him in the most thorough and

surrealistic way — for instance, by boring into his palms with a corkscrew.

In this little masterpiece we find in miniature all the main Nabokovian motifs: the magic carpet for flights of fancy, the eccentric with Nabokov's devouring eyes, and the *poshliaki*, the vulgar blind people with their terrifying vengefulness. The last is, of course, a romantic motif, a new version of Eichendorff's *Taugenichts* humiliated by bare, common people. The obsessed chess player, Luzhin, the grotesque Cincinnatus invited to a beheading, the funny darling Pnin, or Lolita's lover Humbert, and many others belong to the same family of romantic dreamers with artistic vision. Their field of vision can be very broad (Humbert) or very limited — by a chessboard (Luzhin), by a printed text (Pnin), or by the walls of a prison (Cincinnatus) — but each has his own image of objects he wishes to devour and digest.⁵

Who is Lolita's lover, Humbert? In a new Dantesque-Dostoevskian hell of the twentieth century, in a world where both God and man have been killed, where none repent because the very concept of sin has been eliminated, in this liberal and progressive inferno Humbert discovers that he loves his nymphet more than himself, as much as, once upon a time, Dante adored his Beatrice and Othello his Desdemona. Finally, Humbert creates his own code of good and evil. He is a villain who, toward the end of the novel, condemns himself. However, this is of little importance. He is a romantic poet who once exclaims, "Oh, my Lolita, I have only words to play with!"⁶ This cry expresses the purely Nabokovian feeling of space, with Lolita at the center, encircled by thousands of details described in figures of speech, or tropes. We are delighted, for example, at seeing

⁵V. Nabokov, *Zashchita Luzhina* (*The Defense of Luzhin*), written about 1930 and published in *Sovremennye Zapiski*. Cincinnatus is the main character in Nabokov's novel *Invitation to a Beheading*, translated by his son Dmitri. (New York, 1959.)

⁶V. Nabokov, *Lolita*, p. 34.

Humbert's knees like "reflections of knees in rippling water,"⁷ or the "alternating strips of quick-silverish water,"⁸ or some cheap, but immortalized, trinkets that the lover bought for his adolescent *inamorata*. All these observations are more existential, perhaps, than the characters of Humbert and Lolita.

Nabokov's devouring eyes, lent sometimes to the narrator, sometimes to other characters, provoke both envy and excitement in the reader. The appetite grows while eating, but not in large amounts. Perhaps the message of Nabokov's creative writings is: enjoy life, any kind of life worthy of artistic transformation. *Lolita* is charming; butterflies are charming too. But no less exciting is, for instance, *Pnin*.

It warmed my heart, the Russian-intelligentski way he had of getting into his overcoat: his inclined head would demonstrate its ideal baldness, and his large, Duchess of Wonderland chin would firmly press against the crossed ends of his green muffler to hold it in place on his chest while, with a jerk of his broad shoulders, he contrived to get into both armholes at once; another heave, and the coat was on.⁹

The basic pattern of Nabokov's novels reproduces the plot-design of the traditional novel. But the emphasis is not on subject-matter but on style: similes, metaphors, puns, alliteration. (Note "the musk and the mud . . . the dirt and the death," "desire and decision," "if his (Pnin's) Russian was music, his English was murder.") Industrious students will find more elaborate devices. For instance, short striking sentences such as "Harm is the norm," (in a novel, *G.I.*); or "Doom should not jam"; or, simply, "Poets never kill."

Not only the Russian Nabokov (Sirin), but also the English one sometimes follows Gogol, by whom any kind of offal could be transmuted into pearls by the magic of Art. Such insignificant things as wooden boxes with nails, yellowish sulfur, raisins, soap, or a jar of dried-up candies are thus transfigured. Both

⁷Ibid., p. 42.

⁸Ibid., p. 154.

⁹V. Nabokov, *Pnin*, 1957, p. 65.

Gogol and Nabokov intensify images for the reader by their way of isolating objects, or pinpointing them in space. Intensity is the essential criterion applied by both to all that is seen.

Critics have sought Kafkaesque motifs in the writings of Nabokov. They are defeated from the start. Even in *Invitation to a Beheading*, he treats the whole nightmare situation in a very different way. Where Kafka is tortured with pain, Nabokov is making faces. His surrealism is, in fact, closer to Lewis Carroll. The epilogue to *Invitation to a Beheading*, where Cincinnatus discovers that the grotesque decorum of the execution is not at all real, recalls Alice's discovery in the realm of the Queen:

"Why, they're just a pack of cards after all. I needn't be afraid of them!" The Queen began screaming, "Off with her head! Off—!" "Nonsense," said Alice, loudly and decidedly, and the Queen was silent.

Following the advice of this brave little girl, Cincinnatus too realizes that the execution is simple nonsense, and leaving the novel, he enters a world unknown, but real.

Nabokov's never-satisfied appetite for life has a quality of its own. Only by measuring its intensity may one compare his gluttony with that of other life-devouring writers of varying stature, such as Shakespeare or Rupert Brooke, Tolstoy or the young Leonid Leonov.

Perhaps the milieu of Nabokov's youth and his émigré destiny favored the development of his visual omnivorousness. Whether in families of the Russian gentry such as in Nabokov's *Speak, Memory!* or in poor families like that in Bunin's *The Life of Arseniev*, an artistic *joie de vivre* was inherited, and a fanciful way of life was admired and cultivated. The Nabokovs knew very well how to enjoy the pursuit of butterflies or the picking of mushrooms; they took delight in a supper in the garden or a political banquet. Hours of leisure are increasing. Now a weekend covers more than two days, but still how poor

is the quality of modern leisure! No imaginative initiative is displayed in the choice of diversions: television, gardening, shopping, driving. I believe it was Adam Smith who once said that in the future the free and wealthy plebeian society would envy and imitate the smart fancies of the privileged *viveurs* of the past. Unfortunately, this has not yet occurred. Nabokov grew up among the last of the dilettantish, and therefore particularly charming, Russian squires. He affirmed that the children of the latter were gifted with unusual sensitivity and a good memory:

I would, moreover, submit that, in regard to the power of hoarding up impressions, Russian children of my generation passed through a period of genius, as if destiny were loyally trying what it could do for them by giving them more than their share, in view of the cataclysm that was to remove them completely from the world they had known. Genius disappeared when everything had been stored . . .¹⁰

These *Wunderkinder* became misfits, except for Nabokov and a handful of others.

One sharp line divides Nabokov from previous writers of the Russian gentry, who succeeded in creating a literature of universal significance. Pre-revolutionary Russian literature was the most anxious in history, the most *engagé*. I have in mind not only the great messages of the patrician Tolstoy or of the plebeian Dostoevsky. Nearly all of their prophecies were poorly presented, or proved to be wrong. Yet their anxiety over the sense of life was more profound than their sermons. Tolstoy longed to perceive the last mysteries of life—why the young Petya Rostov should die after he had experienced the perfection of happiness, lying on a cart and listening to the harmonious “concert” of the summer night; why the pure-hearted should die so early? (*War and Peace*). Although Pushkin never had the ambition to be a benefactor of mankind, yet he also faithfully served a cause. G. Fedotov called Pushkin the poet

¹⁰V. Nabokov, *Speak, Memory!*, p. 14.

of two hostile realities dear to his heart—Empire and Freedom—and pointed out that the tension between them thus became a main source of his inspiration. Yet Pushkin also was eager to solve a more practical problem: how to create a Russian literary idiom expressing both the innate sensitivity of the artistic Russian nature and the ideas and emotions borrowed from Western Europe.

So Tolstoy, Pushkin, and other predecessors of Nabokov were all *engagé*: they felt strong obligations either to humanity or to their native country. Nabokov, the last Russian nobleman-writer, accepts no obligations except those of an artist. Anxiety, which, according to Heidegger, proves that we really exist on the edge of Nothingness (Nichts), never troubled Nabokov's mind. All the nightmares found in *Invitation to a Beheading* are merely part of a game. The immortal love of a gifted seducer and murderer (Humbert in *Lolita*) is a game too. "Harm is norm," and harm is game, I might add. But Nabokov's admiration for things perceived in space is genuine, as is his mastery in presenting such things by means of similes and symbols.

What drives Nabokov to make his fascinating inventory of the universe? Here is his own answer:

I have to have all space and all time participate in my emotion, in my mortal love, so that the edge of its mortality is taken off, thus helping me to fight the utter degradation, ridicule and horror of having developed an infinity of sensation and thought within a finite existence.¹¹

A struggle with death, then, is what it is—a struggle waged by means of an intensification of life within a limited sphere and a limited time-span.

Everywhere there are some limitations! One might ask: isn't Nabokov's fare too intense, too rich? His similes and puns are well coined, but they are presented to us so constantly that the diet seems unbalanced. Nabokov's offerings should not be

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 224.

swallowed in large quantities, even though the reader may be tempted by the fine flavor of the plot to sample the next portion! One must be wary with this *homo ludens*. It is safest to read him piecemeal, by picking a chapter here or there, like poems in a collection. Taken thus as one eats *hors d'oeuvres*, Nabokov will arouse the reader's appetite and his *joie de vivre*, but overindulgence is apt to bring on a sick satiety.

The Soviet Bar — Past and Present

By ISAAC SHAPIRO

RUSSIAN lawyers have always been fond of saying that the Russian bar, created in 1864 under Alexander II, was not "hatched from an egg" but was the spontaneous generation of an "organism," having no precedent or roots in prior Russian legal history. Many of these same lawyers thought that they had witnessed the death of that "organism" when the Council of People's Commissars of the new Soviet Republic abrogated the pre-revolutionary lawyers' guild on November 24, 1917.

It is true that the men who drafted the legislation establishing the Russian bar had no Russian precedent on which to draw; they were, in fact, seeking to destroy what had passed for a legal profession for over 150 years, during which time few were disqualified from representing others in court. Gogol, Saltykov, and other Russian writers have given eloquent testimony to the low reputation these representatives enjoyed.

However, whether the death of the lawyers' guild in 1917 marked the end of the guild system remains to be seen. During the first two decades of the post-revolutionary era, it certainly did seem that the field of legal representation had become a free-for-all. But a look at the present structure of the Soviet bar indicates that after forty-odd years of growing pains, the guild system has been revived in many respects, though in a new, Sovietized form. After a long period of direct government supervision, the Soviet bar has achieved a measure of independence which would no doubt have surprised many members of the old guild who, in voting to dissolve the pre-revolutionary bar rather than see it merged into a new group, preferred an "honest death" to a "disgraceful life."

The history of the Soviet bar is characterized by its evolution from an essentially bureaucratic institution staffed by non-professionals to its present organizational form, the relatively autonomous college of professionally trained advocates, controlled only indirectly by the Ministries of Justice of the constituent Soviet republics.

In 1917, in a spirit reminiscent of that of the *Constituante* after the French Revolution, the Soviet government had decreed that all Soviet citizens in full possession of their civil rights could act as lawyers, judges, and prosecutors. The following year, a second decree organized court representatives (one could hardly dignify them with the title "lawyers") into colleges attached to local Soviets, who assumed full regulatory control over their activities. Prosecutors and defense counsel belonged to the same college. Subsequently, a third decree, also adopted in 1918, transferred control over these colleges of counsel to the District and Provincial Executive Committees and transformed the college members into salaried government officials, which they remained until 1920, although it was not until 1922 that the basic organizational structure of the Soviet bar was again radically altered.

In 1922, control over colleges of counsel was transferred once again, this time to the Provincial courts. As today, the colleges themselves exercised direct control over their activities through a presidium elected by their members, although the Provincial Executive Committees continued to exercise indirect control through their power to remove members, revoke the admission of new members, and review the colleges' disciplinary decisions.

During the period of the famous New Economic Policy (NEP), when the Soviet Union experienced a temporary reversion to capitalist methods in the economic sphere, private law practice was once again permitted, although the fees were regulated by the State. With the liquidation of the NEP and the general drive toward collectivization of all areas of productive

human activity, the collegial system was firmly re-established and subjected to the direct control of the Commissariats (later Ministries) of Justice of the Constituent Federal Republics, with ultimate control in the hands of the Commissariat of Justice of the U. S. S. R. This collegial system survives to the present day, though in somewhat modified, more liberal form.

Today the Soviet bar is a series of practically self-governing "lawyers' collegiums," apparently subject to far less direct control by the Soviet government than are other types of Soviet collectives.

The lawyers' collegiums are local bar associations whose members (*advokaty* or advocates) have a virtual monopoly on practice in the Soviet courts. A separate collegium exists in each Region—the basic administrative unit in the Soviet Union—and in each Territory, Autonomous Republic, and Union Republic not divided into Regions. In Leningrad and Moscow, the regional and city collegium are separately organized. Each collegium is governed by a presidium elected by the membership every two years. A finance committee is elected at the same time to supervise the financial affairs of the collegium. The presidium—generally numbering about a dozen—elects a president and two vice presidents who perform a variety of executive functions. They are the only members of the presidium who receive remuneration. The presidium exercises jurisdiction over admission to and suspension or expulsion from the collegium. A presidium decision refusing admission, decreeing disbarment, or inflicting disciplinary punishment on a lawyer may, however, be appealed to the Minister of Justice of the appropriate Soviet Republic.

Each collegium maintains a series of legal consultation offices throughout its territory, distributed in a manner calculated to serve the counselling needs of the community in which they are situated. The presidium determines the location of these offices, subject to the approval of the Ministry of Justice of the appro-

priate Republic. There are said to be over 5,000 such consultation offices in operation in the Soviet Union today. Each consultation office has about 30 lawyers on its staff and is run by a salaried manager appointed by the presidium from among the collegium membership. Generally the manager has one non-legal assistant who serves as combination secretary-treasurer and stenographer.

Since 1917, a whole new generation of lawyers has been born. The number of students graduating from law faculties in the Soviet Union has risen sharply. Whereas in 1947 only 2,000 persons were graduated from law schools throughout the country, by 1955 that figure had increased to 7,800. Now, admission to the bar is limited to such graduates.

A young law graduate who is admitted to a lawyers' collegium serves a clerkship—usually one year, though this period is not fixed by law and depends on the clerk's ability—during which time he receives a salary of about 500 rubles (\$50 at the tourist rate) per month. At the end of his probationary period, if he is admitted to practice, he is assigned to cases by the office manager. As time goes on he builds up a clientele and becomes eligible to receive larger fees.

The local legal consultation office is the place to which a potential client comes for legal advice. He may ask to be represented by a particular lawyer known to him; if he specifies no one by name his case is assigned to one of the lawyers on duty. Specialization is frequent, though not the rule, and cases are often assigned on the basis of expertness of particular lawyers. Lawyers are in fact supposed to be allocated among consultation offices with a view to having specialists, both young and old, in various fields available in every consultation office.

The law stipulates that the conduct of suits for alimony and the drafting of legal documents of various sorts for servicemen are to be performed free of charge. In addition workmen's compensation suits are undertaken free of charge, although in some

cases the court may order the plaintiff to pay counsel. Otherwise the paying client is the rule rather than the exception in the Soviet Union. Fee schedules are drawn up by the lawyers' collegiums and approved by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic concerned. The amount of the fee, or, in the case of a contingent fee, the percentage, varies with the complexity of the case and the experience of the lawyer assigned to the case. Consultation office managers have some discretion in fixing fees under 500 rubles. A separate schedule of fees for appellate work is established. Such fees are generally higher than trial fees.

Soviet lawyers give legal advice not only to individuals but to government institutions and enterprises as well. Such services may be rendered on a case by case basis or, as has become the custom recently, on the basis of an annual retainer which the institutional client pays to the attorney. In such a case a regular retainer agreement is concluded between the consultation office and the client.

All payments by both institutional and private clients are made to the legal consultation office and credited to the account of the lawyer who worked on the particular matter. At the end of each month the bookkeeper in each consultation office pays the amount credited to the lawyer, after deducting approximately 25% to 30% to cover the various overhead expenses of the collegium. Part of this amount actually represents the lawyer's contribution to various social security funds, including a vacation fund, a loan fund, a fund for death benefits, and a retirement fund.

The work of the Soviet lawyer is varied and includes both criminal and civil matters, with civil matters apparently more numerous. This might seem surprising in a country where all means of production and distribution of goods and services is either State—or collectively—owned. Nevertheless, a great deal of civil litigation involving personal and property rights of individuals appears on Soviet court calendars.

The Soviet lawyer deals with a wide range of civil matters. Soviet law permits private ownership of two-story family dwellings, and thus legal problems arising out of the transfer, either by sale or inheritance, of real property arise from time to time. Suits for alimony appear very frequently on court calendars. Soviet law permits the transfer of private personal property by will or intestate succession, and estate litigation is far from rare. Labor disputes involving suits for reinstatement following an allegedly illegal dismissal arise frequently. Tort litigation is less frequent because of broad workmen's compensation programs and is generally limited to suits by self-employed or unemployed persons.

Although the members of the lawyers' collegiums have a monopoly on practice in the Soviet courts, a great deal of legal counseling is done by lawyers who have not been admitted to the bar. These lawyers act as house counsel to government agencies, enterprises, collectives, or individual factories. Commercial suits between government corporations are not tried by the courts but by specially constituted government arbitration tribunals before which the parties are generally represented by such internal counsel. They are often employed by two or three different institutions at the same time and so collect several salaries. When a conflict of interest develops, they disqualify themselves and one of the parties hires outside counsel.

A special college of advocates known as "Injurcollegia," a "subsidiary" of the Moscow College created in 1937, is responsible for providing litigation counsel for foreigners in the Soviet Union and for Soviet citizens abroad. Though foreigners from non-Communist countries rarely appear as parties in a Soviet court, they do, on occasion, become involved in proceedings before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission through their commercial relations with the Soviet government's foreign trade monopolies. Foreign parties appearing before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission have, on the whole, been satis-

fied with the caliber of counsel provided them by Injurcollegia.

I spent four weeks in the Soviet Union during the summer of 1958 and visited the Soviet Union again during the summer of 1959. During these sojourns, I toured legal consultation offices in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. In each city I met with large groups of Soviet lawyers for informal discussions which ranged from the merits of capital punishment to the price of eggs in America. I was impressed with the apparent freedom with which my interlocutors discussed shortcomings in their own legal system and with the fact that there was disagreement among them on many issues. Naturally, they were convinced of the superiority of Soviet justice, though, aside from statistics on recent lynchings, their ignorance of the American legal system and law enforcement in the United States was almost total. On occasion one of the group would try to provoke a political debate, but he was usually restrained by his colleagues. The older lawyers, even those who had begun to practice after the Revolution, readily acknowledged their link with a legal heritage going back beyond 1917. In fact, one of the vice-presidents of the Moscow City Collegium remarked to me that whereas world scientists were making great strides, we lawyers had not made much progress in the last hundred years.

I saw other evidence of "reaction." Forensic oratory, for instance, has once again come into fashion among Soviet lawyers and the best orations are collected and published from time to time as they were in pre-revolutionary days, a departure from the antagonism to courtroom eloquence which was current for so many years of the Soviet era.

Not all the Soviet lawyers with whom I spoke were "reactionary." Some, parroting Soviet doctrine, insisted that the Soviet lawyer was a new phenomenon and the great champion of individual rights, which rights could have true meaning only in a society where justice was not a tool of the ruling classes. This kind of talk appeared, however, on many occasions to embarrass

the colleagues of the talker, and I did not hear such opinions expressed frequently.

I left the Soviet Union with the impression that, despite the many differences which distinguish the practice of law in the Soviet Union from its practice in the United States, there is a growing area of common legal problems which the Soviet lawyer is no longer reluctant to discuss, and that wider contacts between the members of the legal professions of the two countries could serve a useful purpose.

Book Reviews

DANIELS, ROBERT V. *The Conscience of the Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, 526 pp. \$10.00

Fundamentally this book is a study of the conflicts within the Russian (All-Union) Communist Party from 1917 through 1929. Within this chronological framework attention is concentrated upon the opposition groups within the party, from the "Left" Communists of 1917-1920, through Trotsky's fateful struggles leading to his expulsion from the party and the country, and on to the efforts of Bukharin and other "Right deviationists" to stand against Stalin. These successive and closely related opposition movements and the means by which the party's rulers acted against them are described in exhaustive detail and carefully analyzed for their significance in the development of the Soviet political system. Useful charts and a valuable bibliography are appended.

Fortunately the book is much more than a mere recording of the intra-party squabbles of a revolutionary party turning itself into a governing bureaucracy. Thoroughly at home among the best theories and hypotheses advanced in recent years to explain the course of Soviet history, Professor Daniels moves from the criticism of Marxian theory and Leninist practice to the consideration of Soviet political, economic, and social realities with impressive ease. He skillfully

transforms the relatively familiar story of Communist Opposition into a dramatic and searching history of Soviet political evolution. His treatment of events manifests an intellectually satisfying awareness that they were determined not only by a developing ideology and the will to power of a few manic Communist leaders, but also by the haphazard and unsystematic influences of a wide variety of men, historical traditions and accidents, economic and social forces, and external relations.

Within this intricate matrix, Daniels sees the "Left" Communists acting as "watchdogs of revolutionary virtue," trying desperately but never very realistically to save what was for them the true spirit of the revolution—the utopian dream of justice and equality based upon democratic principles and procedures. Opposed to these men of principle were the Leninists (later, read *Stalinists*; then, *Stalin*), whose eyes were focused always upon power and the means to power. There was also a derivative current of opposition, the "Right deviation," fed by defecting Leninists who at one point or another in the cumulative bureaucratization of the régime realized that the party dictatorship was not the instrument for good they had hoped it would be. Hesitantly and fecklessly these "Rightists" sought to turn the burgeoning dictatorship to a softer, safer line.

In the years following 1917 the

Leninists developed the party's rules and perfected its organization. They worked awkwardly at first, then with increasing ruthlessness and efficiency. Eventually they perverted almost every principle of the party and every moral precept known to man, for the preservation of their own evil power. Through the Leninists' complicated, sometimes planless, and sometimes provoked conflicts with the Communist Opposition, Daniels traces the development of Stalin's totalitarian system. That system, prating about its omniscience, solemnly mouthing the sacred but "irrelevant" dogmas of Marx and Lenin, and boasting of its unity, in fact worshipped only its own power and the apparatus in which it had embedded that power.

Professor Daniels writes with authority and lucidity. Throughout the book his ideas are expressed with an epigrammatic precision that represents some of the most perceptive thinking that has been done on the early evolution of the Soviet political system. In particular, his summaries of the over-all meaning of the historical processes he describes are both persuasive and memorable.

ARTHUR E. ADAMS

Michigan State University

ULAM, ADAM B. *The Unfinished Revolution. An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism.* New York, Random House, 1960. 307 pp. \$5.00.

"My main interest," states Professor Ulam in his preface, "has been to find out what makes Marx-

ism alive and relevant in certain societies, while elsewhere socialism and communism remain the creeds of insignificant sects or intellectual coteries." This interest is further defined in his statement of the problem: "To sum up: from a variety of vantage points a study of Marxism is a study not of disembodied ideas, but of crucial social and political ideas; not only of theories but also of human emotions which have shaped and continue to make the modern world."

(p. 11) And, again, ". . . to ascertain the social and intellectual forces that gave rise to the Marxist structure, and to see where in the modern world the same or similar forces endow Marxist economies with relevance and persuasiveness." (p. 33)

These three statements and the book's main title, probably plus a subjective inference, led this reviewer to anticipate an emphasis upon contemporary applications and appeals of Marxism. This misapprehension resulted in a wonderment and sense of frustration as page followed page with only passing allusions to the present. Not until the penultimate chapter does the emphasis focus on recent and contemporary matters. This observation is not meant to imply any lack of value or of interest in the first five chapters, nor in the book as a whole. Its purpose is to warn the reader against repeating the reviewer's mistake. Professor Ulam's approach is primarily historical—certainly not cause for a complaint by an historian, and the largest section of the book deals with situations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Professor Ulam places greater quantitative empha-

sis upon what was than upon what is or what will be.

His general thesis is that Marxism has succeeded and will succeed only where and when it (or selected portions of it) answers or appears to answer the needs of the times. "... the success or failure of Marxism does not depend on its passing the test of historical prediction; it depends on the existence of conditions in which the questions and answers that Marx give [sic] appear both important and convincing to the working class." (p. 160) The major appeals of Marxism are its interwoven anti-industrialism and its faith that industrialism is the tool by which, in other hands, progress can be achieved. In countries where industrialization is beginning, the workers are mostly "uprooted countrymen" who are haunted by a nostalgia for what they once were and oppressed by the monotony and discipline of what they have become. One of the results of industrialization is that the *quondam* countryman, in the process of becoming a proletarian, loses his property and thereby suffers a loss of status. He responds by restlessness, rebelliousness, and a high degree of suggestibility to the Marxian doctrine of anarchism or destructiveness.

Professor Ulam discerns in Marxism a two-stage ideology: anarchism, or anti-industrialism, or attacks upon the existing order; and, second, a rapid and drastic use of industrialization under the leadership of the victorious Marxist leaders. He stresses this duality especially in terms of the Russian experience. "Until the end of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks . . . be-

came in all respects, *save the internal organization of their party*, [his italics] anarchists." (p. 191) "... the psychological mechanism instilled by Marxism in its devotees . . . makes them prone to anarchism in the time of revolution, to centralism and inequality after power has been won." (p. 194) "... Marxism in power is the exact opposite of Marxism in revolution and . . . the first task of the victorious Communist party is the extirpation of revolutionary democracy and anarchism within its own ranks." (p. 195)

Professor Ulam believes that ideology ("... the inherent ideological assumption of the Communist party made it of necessity a totalitarian party." p. 204) plus a power drive ("The party became the state." p. 203) explain the Soviet policies of forced-draft industrialization and collectivization. "Marxism - Communism became equated with rapid and drastic industrialization." (p. 213), and all revolutionary, anarchistic, and democratic elements were sacrificed to it.

His analyses of the contemporary Soviet scene are equally acute. When industrialization has been achieved, he observes, "The sense of the historical mission of Communism in the USSR becomes less and less clear. (p. 254) "It is not only the heroic period of the party's history that now holds little meaning to its members, but the whole ideology, the meaning of socialism itself, as compared with everyday concrete problems of life." (p. 271) But, Ulam warns, "... it is quite possible that the inherent contradictions of Soviet Communism may not lead to the erosion of

Soviet totalitarianism" [his italics] (p. 276). And he observes that imperialist expansion may be the outlet chosen by the Soviet rulers as the safety valve for internal pressures.

Professor Ulam's study is thoughtful, perceptive, erudite, and—as has been observed—largely historical. Despite its relative brevity, it is comprehensive in scope, and the reader will find in it discussions of the socialist movements in England (especially Chartism), France, and Germany, as well as in Russia and the Soviet Union. Ulam concludes, though not in these words, that Marxism failed in the first three countries because it missed the famous "tide in the affairs of men which, taken at its flood leads to fortune." It caught the tide, and won success, in Russia and in China, and may repeat this process in those new countries which are now seeking to vault into the industrial era.

Professor Ulam's style, despite an occasional light touch, tends to be heavy and sometimes awkward. His acute observations are embedded in and separated by long passages of ponderous prose, but they are quantitatively and qualitatively worth making the effort to find.

WARREN B. WALSH
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JOHN N. HAZARD. *Settling Disputes in Soviet Society. The Formative Years of Legal Institutions*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 534 pp. \$9.50.

The publication of *Settling Disputes in Soviet Society* coincided with developments in the U.S.S.R. which recall the experiments de-

scribed by Professor Hazard in this new work. The purpose of the book, as the author himself explains it, is "to test with Soviet data the thesis that modern man can settle his disputes in a simple way, without legal representation, without complicated laws, and without a labyrinth of rules of procedure and evidence."

The author's new work is devoted to the "formative years" of Soviet legal institutions (1917-1925). It was a period of naive illusions, blind hatred for the so-called "bourgeois order," impractical experiments during 1917-1919, and the subsequent years of NEP (1920-1925). This period seems to be too removed, and the data reproduced in the book, the numerous references to acts and declarations, to laws and legal cases, might remind one of a kind of archeological excavation, were it not for the fact that the problem of a simplification of the Soviet judiciary system recently has been revitalized. Besides, the data relating to the first years of the Communist regime, no matter how valuable they may be, do not open any real perspectives and the reader of the book under review may expect that its author will publish another volume.

Almost simultaneously with the publication of this new work, six excellent lectures delivered by Professor Hazard at the Free University of Brussels were published under the title *Le droit soviétique et le dépérissement de l'Etat*. In his lectures Professor Hazard not only summarizes the main features of the book under review but he also covers a longer period of time and expands the discussion of the problems treated in his work. He in-

cludes divergences of views between the Soviet leaders and Soviet lawyers concerning a systematization of Soviet laws; the borrowing by several Soviet jurists of the German conception of *Wirtschaftsrecht* (economic law) and the subsequent condemnation of this "heresy"; the temporary abolition of rules regarding marriage and matrimonial rights and obligations; and, finally, the differences so far as the future of international law is concerned. All this is expounded by Dr. Hazard against a background of belief in the imminent withering away of State and Law and contemporary problems. It is quite feasible that Dr. Hazard intends to proceed with his work in English and carry it to completion by publishing one more volume.

The new experiments in the Soviet Union indicate that there actually exists a certain tendency to abolish law and its inevitable formalities in the U.S.S.R., and therefore a more comprehensive study of the problem becomes indispensable. Soviet Premier Khrushchev suggested at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party that the ordinary courts be replaced by "comrade" courts. At the present time, factory workers try those who violate labor discipline; a meeting of kolkhoz farmers may subject kolkhoz members to various repressions; inhabitants of an apartment house may pass judgment on other tenants; and even inhabitants of certain blocks of a city may try persons charged with "antisocial" behavior. In conformity with the above-mentioned suggestion by Khrushchev, a decree was issued on March 10, 1959, making citizen units responsible for maintaining

public order. At present, Soviet jurists are criticizing the practice by which collectives and meetings are transformed into *sui generis* people's courts. They argue that any guarantee of justice will disappear in a situation where there are kept no protocols of meetings, where the defendant has no right to demand the examination of evidence and no right to appeal (see *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1960, No. 1). Yet, the decree has remained in force.

It would hardly be justified to consider the phenomena just described to be a genuine revival of the experiments of the first revolutionary years, which Professor Hazard characterized in his book; but apparently the idea of the "withering away of State and Law" is stirring again in the Soviet Union. Actually, Lenin and his followers never believed in the possibility of ruling the country without strong legal order and a powerful state. The idea of the "withering away of law" had been exploited partly as one of the alluring slogans predicting the future of Communist paradise, but mainly as an ideological foundation for the destruction of the pre-revolutionary system. Least of all one may expect that the present-day leaders of the Soviet Union are prepared to diminish the power of the State. An editorial in the *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 1960, No. 1, and the article by P. S. Romashin in the same magazine, 1960, No. 10, indicate exactly the opposite. Is it not likely that the Soviet government simply prefers to apply repressions by the hands of the "comrades" and volunteers, by transferring its own responsibility to the rank-and-file citizen and by

dividing society into different groups? Also, is it not a convenient method to prosecute some disloyal citizens for behavior which cannot be rightly classified as a crime?

Be it as it may, the problem of the withering away of law and of the simplification of procedure deserves further investigation. Professor Hazard's book is a valuable approach to such a study.

GEORGE C. GUINS

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ROGGER, HANS. *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960. 319 pp. \$6.75.

"National consciousness in eighteenth-century Russia was a phenomenon which differed in nature and extent from superficially similar attitudes which preceded and followed it. It was more articulate and less instinctive than mere xenophobia; it was less religious, more secular, and less isolationist than the official nationalism of Muscovy or that of the Old Believers; it was neither so comprehensive a world view nor so messianic a belief as were the nationalist theories of the nineteenth century." With these words Professor Hans Rogger characterizes in his concluding chapter the essence of Russian national feelings in the century of Peter and Catherine. He adds that the milder and less crystallized type of nationalism in that century was the result of a transitional period, of "an age in which old thought patterns and ways of life slowly gave way to new beliefs and practices." The most salient feature of this nation-

alism was the unprecedented receptivity to all influences coming from Western Europe, and in his opinion *this receptivity is the basic clue* for understanding the process of formation of Russian national consciousness. Although the author does not make it clear whether he applies this characteristic of receptivity exclusively to the intellectual process of the eighteenth century or to the entire history of Russian nationalism, doubtless an aptitude and even eagerness for absorbing the leading Western ideas was the most patent feature of the Russian mind in the century under study.

Many works have treated the intellectual development of eighteenth-century Russia, but, to the knowledge of this reviewer, none has ever attempted to concentrate exclusively on the process of formation of national feelings in Russia at that time. Such standard works on the history of Russian intellectual development as those of V. Kliuchevsky, A. Pypin, V. V. Zenkovsky and P. Miliukov have treated the problem of the growth of national consciousness only within the general framework of intellectual history. Most other Russian historians have had the same approach. Therefore this new book by Professor Rogger deserves the special gratitude of all readers and scholars interested both in Russia's past and the history of national ideologies, especially since he has performed his task with painstaking scholarship and frequent brilliance.

This task was particularly difficult since, during the entire eighteenth century, only a few Russian writers were concerned with the

problem of national identity. Only Boltin, Shcherbatov, Novikov and Catherine II herself seriously attempted precisely to determine in what "purely" Russian virtues and traditions consisted. Any other material to be found on the formation of national identity is largely scattered in isolated articles, poetry and drama, private correspondence and memoirs, official documents and journalistic polemics. Most of this material has been conscientiously investigated by Professor Rogger, who has given an ample and almost exhaustive picture of the national ideology of Russian Westernized society in the eighteenth century. The term "Westernized" is here added because Professor Rogger apparently intended to exclude from his work the writings of the non-Westernized Old Believers. In the reviewer's opinion, this is the major shortcoming of his study, since in the writings of the Denisov brothers, Ivan Filipov and other leading traditionalists there can be found some important links uniting the national ideas of Old Muscovy with some basic tenets of the nineteenth-century Slavophiles, and even the Populists. It would also have been desirable, perhaps, to present to the reader the basic elements of pre-Western, Old Muscovite national consciousness, which are just mentioned in the final pages. The reader can therefore gain the impression that national consciousness in Russia arose only in the eighteenth century and that in the earlier periods there were no important efforts made to identify the historic role and traditions of the Russian nation and people. Both of these

topics, although marginal to the main thesis of the author, might help to clarify the process of development of the Russian national mind. In his treatment of the main subject, however—nationalism and the formation of a new Western-oriented national consciousness at court and throughout the aristocracy and leadership of eighteenth-century imperial Russia—Professor Rogger has presented a most useful, interesting, and comprehensible study.

SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

University of Colorado

GREY, IAN. *Peter the Great, Emperor of All Russia*. Philadelphia and New York, Lippincott, 1960. 505 pp. \$7.50.

In this admirable biography of the great Peter, the author, although not an academic historian, displays full mastery of the historian's craft and a praiseworthy diligence, for he has used the leading Russian sources, including both pre-revolutionary and Soviet works and compilations of the Tsar's papers, and in addition has drawn heavily on the works of travelers, Peter's associates, and other contemporaries. While he has not provided footnotes for all his statements, he has documented most of the controversial points, often analyzing the merits of conflicting evidence. Thus, though Mr. Grey's technique may not fully satisfy exacting scholars, his volume is worthy of real respect. In addition, it has the great virtue of a well written and readable style.

The author's interpretation is not strikingly new or revolution-

ary, except in its emphasis. He admits that at times Peter was horribly cruel, but points out that his was a cruel age, which witnessed the Bloody Assizes in England, the Glencoe massacre, and other horrors. Also, he contends that Peter, while not notably continent, was far from the promiscuity of August II of Poland and England's Merry Monarch. Mr. Grey lays emphasis chiefly on Peter's sincerity, earnestness, hard work, and the humbleness that caused him to renounce honors for his achievements until he had truly deserved them. Above all, he feels that Peter served Russia devotedly and to it sacrificed himself and others without stint. Not least of those sacrificed was his son, Alexei, who, the author believes, was the center of a real plot to destroy all of his father's work. From a study of the available evidence he carefully pieces together the story of the frightful fate of this royal misfit.

The peasants also bore the brunt of Peter's exactions. From their midst came the thousands of soldiers and sailors who won the victories of the Tsar and the unhappy laborers who died like flies in the digging of canals and the building of the bleak new capital. And yet the author regards Peter as a man who had the interests of his country at heart. Not for himself but for Russia did he construct ports and canals, iron foundries and schools. Many prominent men of the West, among them the famed Leibnitz, admired Peter's intellect and his zeal for education. The reform of the Russian alphabet and the founding of the first newspaper were marks of Peter's effort to enlighten his people.

One of Peter's chief failures was in diplomacy. He was too trusting in his choice of allies, notably Poland and Denmark, and he antagonized England and much of Germany by his support of Mecklenburg and Holstein. He wasted men, treasure, and years in seeking a coalition that would compel the Swedes to accept peace on Russian terms, with little result except English hostility and repeated betrayal by his potential allies. Finally Peter himself had to resort to invasion and devastation of Swedish territory to win the Peace of Nystad.

Mr. Grey strongly admires Peter while admitting his many flaws. Thanks to his unsparing efforts Russia advanced along the course mapped out by preceding rulers. And yet there is the nagging question: Would not Russia have been better served by a more moderate policy instead of the frantic drive for immediate results? Mr. Grey, who believes that Peter "belongs among the very great princes of history," feels that his way was best.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS
Duke University

ISWOLSKY, HELEN. *Christ in Russia. The History, Tradition and Life of the Russian Church.* Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1960. 213 pp. \$3.95.

The author of this book is Russian-born and a convert from Orthodoxy to the Roman Catholic Church. In her introduction she describes the task she wished to fulfill, "to offer a panorama, a 'bird's-eye' view of the Russian church." The book is divided into

two main parts. In the first the author deals with "the Russian Church in History," and in the second with "The Russian Church in Tradition and Life." In the opinion of this reviewer, the first part is more satisfactory; the second is fragmentary, and the selection of material here is uneven and of varying value.

The new interest in the unity of the Christian church is reflected in this work. Whenever possible the author points to the common background of the Russian and the Roman Catholic churches. Thus she stresses that "Vladimir's final decision in no way implied hostility to Rome. There could be no break on his part with the Western Church for the simple reason that such a break did not as yet exist in Byzantium." She adds that St. Vladimir, like St. Sergei, "is recognized by Rome as a saint of the Universal Church."

The responsibility for the division of 1054 between East and West, according to Miss Iswolsky, "did not entirely rest with the East." An Orthodox historian would perhaps admit that it "did not entirely rest with the West." It seems that both Orthodox and Roman historians in our day are aware that neither side was innocent in the events leading to the division of the Universal Church. This admission of fault on both sides creates a favorable atmosphere for fruitful discussion between the two churches. Miss Iswolsky clearly states that there were misunderstandings on both sides, and few would disagree with her that the sack of Constantinople in 1204 by warriors of the fourth crusade was the most un-

fortunate event in the relations between Eastern and Western Christianity.

The author seems to imply that the Council of Florence (1439) and the Union of Brest-Litovsk (1595) were positive steps toward reunion. In describing the Russian reaction to the Council of Florence, she writes, "Unaware of the theological implications of the Council and being completely unprepared to meet them, the Russian Church could only turn away from them . . . She had lost almost entirely the ecumenic spirit and had lived in splendid isolation." Yet we must point out that, even with the awakening of the ecumenical spirit in recent times, Orthodox theologians do not regard the decisions of Florence and Brest-Litovsk and their "theological implications" as leading to the unity of the Church. They still are obstacles to mutual understanding between the two churches. Far from building on past experience, an entirely new approach, based on a new theological understanding, must be found before these two churches can find a ground for union.

The references to Soloviev illustrate another of the problems of interpretation in using this book. When the name of the Russian religious philosopher Soloviev is mentioned, the author often observes that he became Catholic (p. 45), or that he is "one of the most famous Russian Catholics" (p. 102), or that he is "a brilliant member of the Russian Orthodox Church, who later became a Catholic" (p. 127). Whether Soloviev ever renounced the Orthodox Church and joined the Roman

Church is rather a complex problem. The Russian philosopher Nicholas Lossky in his work, *The History of Russian Philosophy*, writes, "In fact Soloviev had never left the Orthodox Church; he merely came to the conviction that the Eastern and Western Churches, despite the outward breach, had not severed their mystical bond" (p. 84). In his conviction as to this mystical unity, Soloviev "might have left Catholics under the impression that he had renounced Orthodoxy and become a Roman Catholic. It can, however, be proved beyond doubt that Soloviev remained faithful to the Orthodox Church" (p. 85; see Lossky, pp. 84-87).

This is a useful and interesting book for those seeking an introduction to the history of Russian Orthodoxy, particularly because of its timely focus. Used with other books in this field, it will contribute to an understanding of the Russian Church.

VESELIN KESICH

*St. Vladimir's Orthodox
Theological Seminary,
Columbia University*

BLANCH, LESLEY. *The Sabres of Paradise*. New York, Viking Press, 1960. 495 pp. \$6.75.

During the second quarter of the nineteenth century the northern and eastern reaches of the fabled Caucasus territory between the Black and Caspian Seas became the scene of one of the fiercest and most picturesque colonial wars in history. The Moslem tribesmen of this area, swept by an ascetic movement known as Muridism and united under the leadership of a

chieftain, Shamyl, who combined military prowess with the reputation of an inspired holy man, rose in revolt and resistance to Russian attempts to pacify the country and organize it as part of the huge Russian Empire.

Although this struggle is commemorated in such works of Tolstoy as *The Cossacks* and *Hadji Murad*, although the name of the legendary Shamyl is still remembered in the *aouls*, or craggy mountain villages, of his native Chechnia and Daghestan, there has never been available in English a readily accessible story of this mighty clash between two cultures, two peoples, two ways of life. This gap has now been filled by *The Sabres of Paradise*, the work of an Englishwoman, Lesley Blanch, who is obviously carried away by the romantic possibilities of her subject and who seems to have diligently tracked down all available details of the career and personality of Shamyl, from his early years as a Moslem theological student through the decades of guerrilla fighting and raiding, when he ruled with absolute authority over the wild tribesmen who revered him and followed his green banner into action against the Russian *Giaours*, or infidels, to the final surrender, the life in honorable internment in a Russian provincial town, and the appropriate death in Medina, one of the two holiest cities of Islam.

Shamyl's struggle, prolonged for decades against materially far superior forces, makes as fascinating a story as the most imaginative historical novel; indeed, some of the incidents which actually occurred were as wildly dramatic as

any episodes in Sir Walter Scott's tales of the Highlands or Scotland or Fenimore Cooper's stories of the unceasing war between frontiersmen and Indians.

Especially tragic, in all its aspects, was the fate of Shamyl's son, Djemmal Eddin, given up as a hostage by Shamyl at a low point in his fortunes and then spirited away to St. Petersburg, where he was brought up as a Russian and became one of the favored aides of Tsar Nicholas I. Shamyl never forgot or forgave the loss of his son and devised a plot to secure his return. He sent some of his wild horsemen raiding into the lowlands of Georgia to kidnap three princesses who were living in unconcerned security in a summer mansion supposed to be out of range of the fighting.

The princesses with their children, a French governess who lived to tell the story, and a number of their servants were carried away by circuitous mountain paths to the "Great Aoul" where Shamyl made his headquarters and directed his irregular military operations. Although they were not maltreated and were kept in Shamyl's private quarters, where they got acquainted with a shrewish older wife and a gentle and attractive younger wife, who had been converted from Christianity, the food and sanitary conditions made their stay in this high mountain retreat for many months a grim ordeal.

In the end, after much haggling and bickering, the prisoners were released in exchange for the return of Djemmal Eddin and payment of a ransom of forty thousand rubles. Much higher sums were demanded by the greedy tribesmen

and it took all Shamyl's cunning to hold down the ransom demand to a sum which could be paid.

But Shamyl soon found that he had recovered only the body of his son. Djemmal Eddin's spirit was thoroughly Russian; after the gaieties of the Court and the wonders of the outside world the young Caucasian could not reconcile himself to the primitive fanaticism and barbarous poverty of life in the mountain fastnesses. He pined away and finally died.

In time it would be Shamyl's turn to yearn in vain for his eagle nests, perched on the inaccessible high cliffs of the Caucasus. After less competent commanders had failed to cope with Shamyl's infinite resource and skill in guerrilla warfare, the Tsar's armies found a capable commander in Prince Bariatsky. He knew how to combine political with military warfare, to beat the tribesmen at their own games and to solidify the Russian advance by playing on internal divisions of the tribes and singling out the chiefs who deserted Shamyl's standard for rewards.

Many of the dense forests in which Shamyl's "sabres of paradise" were concealed were cut down; the territory under his control shrank more and more to the higher mountains where both food and military supplies ran short. Finally the Caucasian chief, reduced to a handful of faithful followers, decided, for the sake of his family, to surrender, rather than to immolate himself and all those dear to him in a hopeless last-ditch stand.

There was a happy ending in the sense that the new Tsar, Alex-

ander II, was generous to the captured enemy and the Russians treated Shamyl and his relatives and attendants with the consideration due to heroes. But Shamyl yearned for the peaks of the Caucasus, as his unhappy son had longed for St. Petersburg. Finally, a very old man with a name famed throughout the Moslem world, he

died, appropriately enough, in Medina, after a pilgrimage to the holy cities of his faith. This is a fascinating narrative of a little-known chapter of history, related by the author with much gusto in a picturesque and vivid, if somewhat exuberant and florid style.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Book Notices

DANIELS, ROBERT A. (Ed.) *A Documentary History of Communism from Lenin to Mao*. New York, Random House, 1960. 714 pp. \$8.75.

This extensive collection of excerpts from Communist writings deals with Lenin's conception of the party and state prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power; the Revolution and consolidation of power; the opposition groups which arose within the Russian Communist movement; the emergence of the Soviet Union as an important industrial power; and, finally, the international Communist movement. Each document is preceded by a short narrative, and Mr. Daniels has demonstrated that this can be an effective way of tying together a loose collection of writings and presenting them in an orderly and readable fashion.

In compiling a book of this nature an editor is faced with the difficult problem of selectivity. Mr. Daniels has been particularly successful in regard to Leninism and domestic developments within the Soviet Union, but in the field of international Communism he has been less thorough. The tactic of the "united front" has played an important role in Soviet foreign policy at various stages of history, and in a collection of documents on international Communism one would expect to come across statements made in regard to this policy when it was formulated by the Comintern in 1921. Also, it seems

unfortunate that material on the Twentieth Party Congress did not include the remarks made concerning peaceful coexistence, the zone of peace, the "peaceful" transition to socialism, and the question of the inevitability of war.

This criticism is of negligible significance, however, if one takes into consideration the size of Mr. Daniels' undertaking and its overall contribution to an increased understanding of the Soviet Union in terms of the past, present, and future. Mr. Daniels has demonstrated how Communist doctrine has evolved over the years, and from documents on this evolution a picture emerges of the history of Soviet Russia and its leaders.

JOHN H. HODGSON

Graduate School
Harvard University

Kultura. [Russian Issue. Devoted to Polish-Russian Relations.] May, 1960. Paris, Institut Lit-cracki. 130 pp. .75c.

The Polish literary monthly *Kultura*, published for thirteen years in Paris, surprises one by its vitality. Its editor, Jerzy Giedroyc, and his collaborators not only managed to maintain the periodical's independence and high standards—no small achievement for a group of émigrés—but succeeded also in publishing nearly forty volumes of prose and verse under *Kultura's* imprint.

The above issue, published in Russian, represents a very hopeful

attempt to renew the Russian-Polish dialogue, in opposition to the official Communist line and all propaganda whatever its color.

The issue contains Juliusz Mieroszewski's article defining the Polish position, and articles by such well-known Polish writers as Czesław Miłosz, Josef Czapski, and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, all of whom have an intimate knowledge of Soviet Russia.

The issue closes with a poem to Boris Pasternak and a literary sensation smuggled abroad—an original story by a young Soviet underground writer, whose pseudonym is Abram Terz. *Kultura* was the first to publish it in Polish in 1959. It has since been translated into many languages, including English, under the title of *The Trial Begins*.

The choice of material stresses faith in human nature. Common thoughts and common emotional reactions point to mutual understanding and common defense against fanatical ideologies.

The Russian issue of *Kultura* was attacked, as was to be expected, by some Polish émigré circles as well as in Warsaw. However, regardless of the results achieved by the effort, the impulse to publish such an issue has its source in the commitment of thinking men to truth and justice—a commitment of the kind which in a more romantic and gallant age made our ancestors die "for our freedom and yours."

TOMIRA W. BUXELL

Baker Library
Dartmouth College

LESNOY, S. *A True History of the "Russ,"* Nos. 1-10. Paris, 1953-1960. 1176 pp. [In Russian.]

When the first thin volume of S. Lesnoy's work appeared, professional historians considered it the side-job of a scholar known in another field and were reluctant to take it seriously. Now, with the last issue already printed, the whole publication demands discussion.

The last issue may be regarded as a summary of the whole work. The author states in a preface the motives for his endeavour, mentions the hardships he has experienced, and explains the peculiar tone of his polemics. He completes his useful bibliography of ancient Russian history which includes about 1,200 titles, and gives a list of sources and books, some of them rather rare, which he has drawn on—more than 300! From his index one can see that the range of subjects covered is very wide—from the Normanist theory and the baptism of Russia to cucumbers and beet roots.

The last issue is also typical of the others. S. Lesnoy collects evidence from Arab sources on the origins of Russia and rightly insists on the importance of medieval sources for this research; in his own work interesting specimens of the same are given. The Normanist theory and historians infected with it are the main target of the author's attack. Similarly, in this book the views of B. A. Rybakov, who represents the body of Soviet historians, are criticized as inconsistent. A new source for our knowledge of Russian paganism which the author calls "Veles'

Book" is mentioned here again, and the story of its discovery and loss is recapitulated, which, however, does not enhance the value of this document, published only in part—even if it is genuine, as the author considers.

Throughout his work S. Lesnoy makes use of little-known sources and offers new interpretations of well-known texts, and this must be appreciated. But when he persistently attacks historians for the deficiency of their methods, he seems to be unaware of any work on historical methodology and the strict rules of *Quellenkunde*, which he himself sometimes violates.

J. J. GAPANOVICH

Australian National University

MAZOUR, ANATOLE G. *The Rise and Fall of the Romanovs*. Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1960. 189 pp. \$1.25.

To present a consistent report on three centuries of Russian history and illustrate it with excerpts from documents and opinions of leading historians, all in less than 200 pages, requires considerable ability for condensation and popularization. Indeed, it must be said to the credit of Professor Mazour that he has accomplished this task with skill. Some of his descriptions of reigns present perfectly rounded and complete short monographs; as for instance the characterizations of Peter the Great, Catherine II, Alexander I, and Alexander II and their reigns. Especially successful is the portrait of Catherine II, often disdainfully treated by Russians and foreign writers who, in their studies of the

nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, frequently forget that the century of Catherine II, Frederick II, and Louis XV was basically different in style and spirit from the moralistic Victorian era. Professor Mazour's seventeenth century, however, seems more controversial. For instance, it is quite an overstatement to speak of Patriarch Philaret as a "noted scholar of his day." This resourceful and intelligent contemporary of Richelieu (and his counterpart in many respects) was an extremely able statesman and ruler, a man of considerable erudition and knowledge, but hardly a scholar. Likewise, the traditional picture of Alexis Mikhailovich as a timid and hesitant Tsar, once again offered here by the author, can hardly be sustained in the light of the latest research. Alexis was not only the physical but also the political father of Peter the Great, and many of the latter's reforms, such as state control of the Church, reorganization of the army, and general strengthening of the monarchical power, had already been carried through by Alexis—a patient, clever, shrewd, and tenacious ruler.

But with the exception of these and some minor controversial points, this compact book may be considered a successful short history of Russia under the Romanov dynasty.

SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

University of Colorado

RUGGLES, MELVILLE AND MOSTECKY, VACLAV. *Russian and East European Publications in the Libraries of the United States*. New

York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 396 pp. \$10.00.

This study, which concentrates on material published within the present geographical boundaries of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, examines the selection, acquisition, and financing involved in building a collection, studies the cataloging and bibliographic control concerned with the organization and use of the materials, and concludes with a survey of library resources, presenting both a descriptive analysis and an evaluation of the quality of the collections. The text is supported by informative notes, appendices incorporating a questionnaire answered by over 1000 libraries, an interview schedule answered by forty-six libraries, statistics derived from the questionnaires, a selected bibliography, and an index.

The bibliographies and listings discussed in this study will suggest many possibilities to reference libraries as well as to others most concerned with the use of the publications. The Soviet book distribution system, purchase as a method of acquisition, as well as exchange and other methods, are

described. The authors recommend against centralization of acquisition but they do favor coordination on a national scale of the activities involved in handling Soviet and East European publications. This has now been accomplished by the formation of the Coordinating Committee on Slavic and East European Library Resources, organized through the efforts of the Association of Research Libraries and the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies.

Within the scope of this study the authors have written a valuable book, bringing together information of assistance not only to librarians but to readers as well. Reference librarians concerned with interlibrary loan can make immediate use of it.

For those interested in the view from the Russian side, two studies of the Indiana University *Slavic and East European Series* are available. These are Paul L. Horecky's *Libraries and Bibliographic Centers in the Soviet Union* (Volume 16) and Boris I. Gorokhoff's *Publishing in the U.S.S.R.* (Volume 19).

VIRGINIA CLOSE

Baker Library,
Dartmouth College

Letters to the Editor

Dear Sir:

A reviewer obviously has the right to his opinion, and I would be the last to challenge Mr. Zenkovsky's review of my book *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* on this ground; his motives and views are a matter of indifference to me. But, like any other author, I am obliged to defend myself against misrepresentation. Mr. Zenkovsky's brief note contains a large number of factual mistakes, distortions, misquotations and actual fabrications. To correct them all a disproportionate amount of space would be needed and I shall therefore limit myself to the more glaring instances.

There are no such personages as "Pavlovich-Weltham" or "Nuri-Es Saud"; the credit for having invented them belongs to Mr. Zenkovsky. (I shall not comment on his minor lapses such as "Dimenstein," etc.) One at least expects a reviewer to copy out titles and subtitles correctly but Mr. Zenkovsky seems to be incapable of doing that; some of my chapter headings as quoted by him—for instance, "Soviet Economic Trade and Aid" (?)—are figments of his imagination. His assertion that Persia is part of the Levant will be of great interest to students of geography and history alike; I prefer not to express an opinion.

These and similar instances could perhaps be explained as mistakes of a reviewer who is not very familiar with the topic under discus-

sion. But when it comes to actual quotations from my book, no such mitigating circumstances can be found for Mr. Zenkovsky's doctoring the text, turning its meaning into the opposite. Mr. Zenkovsky writes: "The analytical and prognostic abilities of the author can be easily seen in his concluding sentences. Writing on the eve of the Lebanese civil war, of Egyptian-Jordanian conflict and the bloody Iraqi revolution, Mr. Laqueur states that the 'Arab leaders, to be sure, have buried the hatchet; even Nuri-Es Saud [sic], Nasser, and King Hussein have temporarily patched up their differences.' Before the book was published Nuri was murdered, Hussein had been close to losing the throne at least three times, and Nasser had managed to come into conflict with almost all other Arab leaders."

If Mr. Zenkovsky had read my book with some attention he would have realized that my concluding sentences could not possibly reflect on "the analytical and prognostic abilities of the author." For my book was written not on the eve of, but several months *after*, the Iraqi revolution, the Lebanese civil war, etc., and there are many references to these events in my book. How could I have failed to "predict" a revolution writing six months after the event?

The "concluding sentences" as quoted by Mr. Zenkovsky are a travesty of the real text, needless to mention. Having read the Zenkov-

sky version, readers may want to compare it with the original: "Arab leaders, to be sure, have buried the hatchet from time to time; even Nuri as Said, King Hussein and Nasser temporarily patched up their differences. But basic conflicts will out, and the new phase in the struggle for power in the Middle East is already upon us."

I do not want to burden this letter with any comment; the facts speak for themselves.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER Z. LAQUEUR

London, England

January 31, 1961

Dear Sir:

I deeply regret that my review of *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* aroused such ire on the part of Mr. Walter Z. Laqueur. In no way did I intend to hurt him or to question his professional qualifications. To my knowledge, Mr. Laqueur and I have never had any personal contact or any reasons for a grudge in academic questions. Only one year before writing the review in question, I mentioned quite appreciatively another work by Mr. Laqueur and pointed out that it "conveys a valuable picture of Communism in the Near Asian countries and Soviet relations with them." (See *The Russian Review*, July 1959, pp. 216-217.)

However, I cannot help but feel that Mr. Laqueur's attack unjustifiably claims "deliberate misrepresentations" and "actual fabrication." Since, however, his complaints cover just four major points,

it is rather easy to answer them. Some of the "fabrications" are misspellings resulting from the fact that my review was submitted in handwritten form (it was written while I was in Europe and had no typewriter at my disposal)—which apparently resulted in misreading and misprinting by the linotypist. It is obvious to any objective reader that such spellings as Pavlovich-Weltham, Nuri es Saud, and Dimenstein in place of Pavlovich Weltman, Nuri as Said, and Dimanstein are due to misprinting or to *lapsus manu*, and not to "inventing."

It is hardly necessary to discuss the use of the term *Levant*. Like *Middle East*, *Near East*, *Orient*, *Balkans*, and other cultural and geopolitical regions, this particular term does not have any concrete geographical limits, although it is usually used in reference to the lands of West Asia and the East Mediterranean Moslem countries. *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, a standard reference in this country, defines *Levant* as follows: "The East; the Orient. *Obs.* except, specif., the countries washed by, or near to, the eastern Mediterranean."

Further, the author is offended by my shortening of his chapter titles, e.g., "Soviet Cultural Policy and the Intellectual Climate in the Arab World." Well, I firmly believe that it is the right and occasionally the duty of a reviewer limited by space to present some chapter headings in abbreviated form.

Still, I believe I do owe an apology to Mr. Laqueur for having erroneously interpreted his sentences on the outlook of peace among the Arab rulers. Unfortunately I do not have my handwritten manu-

script, but I readily agree that in the printed version the quoted sentences misrepresent his idea. I do not believe, however, that this case of an unintentionally committed error in quotation should result in

Mr. Laqueur's offending personal remarks.

Sincerely yours,
SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

University of Colorado
January 31, 1961

Contributors to this Issue

ARTICLES

JESSE D. CLARKSON is Professor of History at Brooklyn College, specializing in Slavic and Russian history. He is the editor and translator of M. N. Pokrovsky's *History of Russia* and author of *A History of Russia*, 1961.

JANKO LAVRIN, Professor Emeritus of Slavonic Languages, University of Nottingham, is the author of many books on Russian literature, including *An Introduction to the Russian Novel*, *Dostoevsky*, *Tolstoy*, *Pushkin and Russian Literature*, *Russian Writers*, and *Lermontov*.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF is Foreign Affairs Adviser, Department of the Army, and author of a number of works dealing with Soviet strategy and policy, including *Soviet Military Doctrine*, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, and *The Soviet Image of Future War*.

GEORGE P. IVASK is Associate Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Kansas and Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Washington. He has contributed poetry and essays on Russian literature both to émigré publications abroad and to American scholarly journals.

ISAAC SHAPIRO, a practicing attorney of the bar of the State of New York and Lecturer in Soviet Law at New York University, has contributed articles to scholarly journals on matters pertaining to Soviet law.

BOOK REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES

ARTHUR E. ADAMS, Professor of History, Michigan State University.

TOMIRA W. BUXELL, Baker Library, Dartmouth College.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, author of *The Russian Revolution* and of other well-known works on the Soviet Union and international affairs.

VIRGINIA CLOSE, Baker Library, Dartmouth College.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS, Professor of History, Duke University.

J. J. GAPANOVICH, Professor of History, Australian National University.

GEORGE C. GUINS, Russian Division, The Voice of America, Washington, D. C.

JOHN H. HODGSON, Graduate School, Harvard University.

VESELIN KESICH, St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, Columbia University.

WARREN B. WALSH, Professor of Russian History and Chairman of the Board of Russian Studies at Syracuse University.

SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY, Associate Professor of Slavic and East European Studies, University of Colorado.

The Diplomacy of the Winter War

AN ACCOUNT OF THE RUSSO-FINNISH CONFLICT, 1939-40

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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New York 16, N. Y.

KEYNOTE RUSSIA

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by Wright W. Miller

Introd. by Alexander Dallin,
Columbia University

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